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Abstract 
This dissertation takes two different research perspectives to address the central theme 
of agricultural production and productivity.  
The first two essays focus on household production, which, as the primary form of 
agriculture to date, not only affects the welfare of individual rural families but also food 
supplies on a global scale. Agricultural productivity hinges largely upon farmers’ choice 
of technology, inputs, and management strategies. Specifically, the first two essays 
investigate land fragmentation, a common farming practice worldwide, and evaluate its 
impacts on agricultural production. Chapter 2 argues that land fragmentation enables 
farmers to reduce risk by diversifying production among discrete plots of land which 
may be subject to heterogeneous growing conditions. Using Tanzanian household survey 
data, this essay finds robust evidence to support a risk-reduction hypothesis and 
indicates that land fragmentation is positively associated with production efficiency. 
Chapter 3 develops a production model that incorporates risk, production efficiency, and 
risk preferences and shows that land fragmentation may encourage risk-averse farmers 
to increase labor intensity, thereby leading to higher efficiency. It is also shown that 
exclusion of risk preferences from efficiency analysis may lead to biased or even 
misleading estimates.  
The second focus of this dissertation is an assessment of the published evidence on the 
payoffs to investments in agricultural research and development (R&D). The related two 
essays focus on methodological as well as policy issues underlying the agricultural R&D 
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evaluation literature. Specifically, Chapter 4 scrutinizes the prevailing internal rate of 
return (IRR) measure and argues that it is based on implausible assumptions that often 
lead to inflated estimates of the returns to research. This essay develops a novel method 
for recalibrating the reported rates of return using a more plausible modified internal rate 
of return (MIRR) measure and derives more modest estimates. Using the detailed 
information collected for each R&D evaluation, Chapter 5 examines how the wide 
variation in the reported IRR estimates can be explained by factors such as research 
type, research focus, commodity type, institutional aspects of the research, target region, 
and methodological specifications. The findings have important implications for future 
agricultural R&D policy as well as R&D evaluation methodologies. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life is 
among the basic rights of humankind. According to the 2014 statistics from the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), however, there are more than 800 million people 
in the world still struggling toward this goal and 98 percent of them live in the 
developing world. Even in developed countries like the United States of America, there 
are millions of people suffering from hunger and food insecurity. Food security has 
become one of the most urgent issues faced by national governments and human society 
as a whole.   
There are different ways to meet food security challenges worldwide. One solution is to 
increase food supplies with more efficient agricultural production and improved 
productivity. Efforts to fight poverty and hunger in past decades, such as the Green 
Revolution, have demonstrated that increasing agricultural production, particularly 
through enhanced technologies, can save hundreds of millions of people from starvation. 
How to pursue that goal, while addressing the growing pressure from issues such as 
population growth, environment protection and climate change, is at the forefront of 
academic research. In this context, this dissertation aims to contribute to the discussion 
surrounding global food security by addressing issues related to agricultural efficiency 
and productivity.  
One approach to scrutinizing agricultural production and searching for improved 
productivity is to look from the perspective of agricultural households, since household 
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production, especially by smallholder farms, remains the dominant mode of agriculture 
production worldwide. According to the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD 2013), there are an estimated 500 million smallholder farms in the 
world, supporting about two billion people. How efficiently agricultural production is 
being carried out at the household level not only matters for the welfare of individual 
rural families but also influences whether we can effectively address food security 
concerns on a global scale. 
A key challenge facing farm households is pervasive production risk arising from 
climatic, biotic, technical, and economic factors. The presence of risk and farmers’ 
aversion towards risk may prevent them from producing efficiently through their choice 
of technology, optimal input use, and other farm management strategies. Policy 
instruments such as agricultural insurance and government subsidy programs have been 
introduced to shield farmers in developed countries from risk; however, these 
instruments are hardly available to farmers in the vast developing world, most of whom 
are still living on the verge of hunger and poverty. How do those farmers manage their 
production under risk and uncertainty?  Is there room for improvement? A better 
understanding of questions like these is an essential step towards mitigating the negative 
impacts of risk on agricultural productivity. 
The first two chapters of this dissertation investigate land fragmentation, a production 
strategy employed by farmers worldwide, and examine how cultivating on multiple, 
discrete plots affects agricultural production. Many researchers and policy-makers see 
land fragmentation as an impediment to efficient farming for various reasons; however, 
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the practice remains common in many parts of the world. Voluntary plot exchanges 
among farmers have been rare even in the presence of land markets, while land 
consolidation programs promoted by governments have not always been successful and 
even been resisted by farmers in some cases (e.g., Heston and Kumar 1983). What has 
made this phenomenon so prevalent and persistent?  
Chapter 2, “Land Fragmentation with Double Dividends – The Case of Tanzanian 
Agriculture,” argues that by spreading production among separate land plots with 
heterogeneous growing conditions, land fragmentation may help farmers mitigate 
production risk, and thus practiced by farmers in spite of its potential shortcomings. 
Applying a stochastic frontier model to household level data taken from the 2008-2009 
Tanzania Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) survey, Chapter 2 finds robust 
evidence to support a risk-reduction hypothesis along with indications that land 
fragmentation is positively correlated with production efficiency, thereby suggesting that 
land fragmentation may be advantageous in two respects (and thus a “double dividend”). 
The findings in this chapter highlight the potential role of land fragmentation as a partial 
substitute for missing insurance markets in countries like Tanzania and warn against a 
general recommendation of land consolidation as a guarantee of enhanced efficiency. 
Starting from the curious positive relationship between land fragmentation and 
efficiency reported in Chapter 2 and several other studies, Chapter 3, “Land 
Fragmentation, Risk Preferences, and Production Efficiency”, looks into more 
channels through which land fragmentation may affect production and further examines 
the applicability of the stochastic frontier framework, which has been the predominant 
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approach in efficiency analysis and measures technical efficiency. It argues that 
although land fragmentation is disadvantageous to technical efficiency, it may still 
encourage farmers to use inputs (e.g., labor in this case) more intensively and lead to a 
higher payoff.   
Chapter 3 first develops a model that incorporates production efficiency and production 
risk as well as risk preferences, which will relate land fragmentation’s efficiency effects 
with its risk effects but are absent from stochastic frontier models. Using numerical 
examples, it is shown that the labor-intensity hypothesis holds true under certain 
circumstances and more importantly, that excluding risk preferences will lead to biased 
or even misleading estimates of efficiency effects. These findings should not only help 
clarify the confusion surrounding the immediate topic of land fragmentation but also 
have implications for the general literature of production efficiency estimation. 
In addition to improving production efficiency at the household level, investing in 
agricultural research and development (R&D) has been a demonstratively effective way 
of promoting agricultural productivity growth, and thereby generating exceptionally 
high reported rates of return (see Alston et al. 2000 for a comprehensive review) and 
fighting hunger and poverty (FAO 2009). Investment areas of this type include the 
development of improved (staple) crops varieties, prevention and control strategies for 
crop and livestock diseases, environmental conservation programs in fishery and 
forestry, and sectors strongly linked to agricultural productivity growth, such as 
agricultural institutions, extension services, storage, and irrigation systems. 
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Given the appropriability problems often associated with agricultural research, a 
substantial proportion of past investments in this area have been made by the public 
sector, including governments and various international institutions (Pardey et al. 2014). 
However, private investments can also be leveraged toward a better functioning 
agricultural system and improved food security (Hebebrand 2011). This poses an 
especially difficult challenge for developing countries where the overall amount of 
agricultural R&D investments is still low and there is a lack of funding opportunities and 
incentives for investments by both sectors.  
Despite the overwhelming evidence of exceptionally high rates of return to food and 
agriculture R&D investments, growth in public spending has slowed worldwide, 
especially in rich countries.  One possible explanation for the slowdown is a 
determination that the evidence for high rates of return is not credible. “Re-examining 
the Reported Rates of  Return to Food and Agricultural Research and 
Development”, Chapter 4 of this dissertation, looks into the methodological 
conventions that pervade the R&D evaluation literature and shows that the internal rate 
of return (IRR) measure has often resulted in inflated rate of return estimates.  
Chapter 4 develops a novel method for recalibrating previously published IRR estimates 
using the modified internal rate of return (MIRR) measure, which is based upon more 
plausible assumptions.  Applying this recalibration methodology lowers the average rate 
of return estimate from around 43 to about 11 percent per year, a level that is more 
modest but typically still larger than the opportunity cost of funds used to finance the 
research. This suggests that society has persistently underinvested in public agricultural 
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R&D, notwithstanding the distorted view of the evidence accumulated in the literature 
over the past half century. 
Chapter 5, “Accounting for Variation in the Reported Rates of Return to 
Agricultural R&D”, focuses on the wide dispersion in the reported rates of return. 
Applying a carefully-designed meta-analysis to a sample of 1,303 internal rate of return 
estimates, this chapter identifies factors, both those associated with the R&D investment 
portfolio itself and those associated with the evaluation methodologies used to assess the 
returns to R&D, that help account for the large dispersion in the reported internal rates 
of returns to research. The findings in this chapter not only help researchers identify 
critical methodological issues in the evaluation literature but also provide clues to 
policymakers regarding future public agricultural R&D policy options.  
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the current debate about how best to solve global 
food security problems through more efficient and stabilized agricultural production. 
The arguments, methodologies, and findings here will be of interest not only to 
economists who specialize in fields such as agricultural production, poverty, and 
economic development but also to governments and various institutions that have a 
direct stake in improving agricultural development outcomes, such as the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation and the CGIAR centers. 
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Chapter 2. Land Fragmentation with Double Dividends – The Case of 
Tanzanian Agriculture 
2.1 Introduction 
Land fragmentation—that is, a single farm consisting of numerous discrete plots 
scattered over a wide area (Binns 1950)—, has long been deemed an impediment to 
agricultural production and rural development. Policymakers describe it as "the blackest 
of evils" (Farmer 1960), and researchers claim that it undermines efficiency and lowers 
profitability (e.g. Jabarin and Epplin 1994; Nguyen et al. 1996; Wan and Cheng 2001; 
Fan and Chan-Kang 2005; and Tan et al. 2008). Until recently, however, land 
fragmentation has remained a common phenomenon in both developed and developing 
countries. For example, Japanese rice growers operated more than four plots on average 
during the period 1985-2005 (Kawasaki 2010); Albanian farmers owned an average of 
four plots per farmer in 2005 (Deininger et al. 2012); and Tanzanian farms in the Mount 
Kilimanjaro regions cultivated an average of 2.5 plots per family in 2000 (Soini 2005). 
This raises the question—why has land fragmentation been so prevalent and persistent?  
Scholars have provided various explanations to account for the prevalence and 
persistence of land fragmentation, including demographic, cultural and institutional 
reasons (see, for example, Heston and Kumar 1983; Bentley 1987; Blarel et al. 1992; 
Niroula and Thapa 2005). Meanwhile, some economists have attempted to re-interpret 
the role of land fragmentation in agricultural production from the perspective of risk 
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management.  McCloskey (1976) was among the first to formally hypothesize that 
cultivation on scattered plots with different soil and location can reduce risk, even 
though it incurs additional travel costs and other inconveniences. This risk-reducing 
function of land fragmentation has been corroborated by several other empirical studies 
such as Blarel et al. (1992), Goland (1993), and Di Falco et al. (2010).  
In practice, voluntary land exchanges among farmers have been extremely rare (Bentley 
1987). Governments in many places have thus been advised to launch consolidation 
programs in the expectation that farmers will benefit from more concentrated land 
holdings. Some of those programs have been deemed successful with more consolidated 
farms as the result, while others have failed due to resistance from farmers (See Heston 
and Kumar 1983 for the failure cases in India; see Niroula and Thapa 2005 for the 
failure cases in India, Pakistan and Thailand). Therefore, whether the existence of land 
fragmentation is economically justifiable is still largely inconclusive. 
The variation in agricultural incomes as a consequence of risk in agricultural production 
has profound implications for the well-being of many farmers in developing countries. 
Unlike their counterparts in the developed world, many of who can avail themselves of 
crop insurance programs or deploy production strategies (such as the use of irrigation or 
pest control chemicals) to protect themselves from adversity, developing-country 
farmers have viable access to far fewer risk management options, such as crop 
diversification and land fragmentation. Further, as observed in many studies (for 
example, Liu 2013), farmers’ aversion to risk may prohibit them from adopting new 
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technologies and improved crop varieties even though they will be rewarded with higher 
expected returns.  
To investigate the role of land fragmentation in agricultural production, this study will 
discuss the economic implications of land fragmentation and evaluate its effects on both 
efficiency and risk. Applying a stochastic frontier model to the analysis of land 
fragmentation, we expect to derive an improved characterization of this phenomenon 
through a careful discussion of determinants of production efficiency and production 
risk. The results from our model will be compared with those from similar studies to 
shed light on future land tenure reforms that aim to secure agricultural production and 
improve farmers' well-being.  
2.2 Land Fragmentation and Plot Heterogeneity 
There is no single measurement of land fragmentation given its economic implications 
in more than one aspects. King and Burton (1982) propose a six-parameter 
characterization: farm size, plot number, plot size, plot shape, plot spatial distribution, 
and the size distribution of the fields, while Bentley (1987) argues that efforts to 
quantify the notion of land fragmentation that fail to account for measures of distance 
are flawed. Among economists, the predominant measure has been the Simpson Index 
( ), which may be used along with other dimension(s) of land fragmentation (e.g. 
Blarel et al. 1992; Hung et al. 2007; Tan et al. 2007; and Kawasaki 2010). For a farm 
household cultivating a total of  plots, denote the area for plot  ( =1,2... ) by , the 
Simpson Index is then defined as: 
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(2-1)   
where is the total farm area. This index returns a value lying within the unit 
interval and increasing in fragmentation. =1 refers to an infinite fragmentation 
scenario while =0 refers farms consisting of a single plot of land. The estimated SI 
value is jointly determined by the number of plots, the farm size, plot size and the plot 
size distribution. 
One common phenomenon that usually confounds considerations of  land fragmentation 
per se is the occurrence of heterogeneous soil quality and growing conditions across 
plots, or plot heterogeneity for short. It is sometimes believed to be a cause of land 
fragmentation or a restricting condition for land consolidation to be implemented 
(Mearns 1999; Niroula and Thapa 2005). What is significant about plot heterogeneity is 
its risk-management role discussed in the literature. By cultivating plots with varying 
micro-environments, farmers are able to reduce the variation in output or income 
because the risk caused by drought, flood and diseases is spread out for the same crop 
(Hung et al. 2007). Bentley (1987) reviewed several studies from this perspective, 
covering both grain crops and cash crops and concluded that the risk management 
advantage of fragmented farms is applicable in many contexts. 
Another value of plot heterogeneity is that it may encourage crop diversification (Bellon 
and Taylor 1993; Hung 2006), a popular strategy for risk reduction. By matching the 
proper crop portfolio with the agro-ecological conditions across the whole farm, farmers 
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are induced to increase crop diversity and stabilize the total farm output. Di Falco et al. 
(2010) present an empirical analysis which finds that land fragmentation fosters crop 
diversification.  
To summarize, the literature has spent a great deal of attention on land fragmentation’s 
impacts on either productivity or profitability, and land fragmentation has been found to 
be detrimental in general. Meanwhile, the risk-management hypothesis of land 
fragmentation has not received much empirical scrutiny, even though it was first 
proposed in the economics literature some time ago. The few existing studies that 
examine the risk effect of land fragmentation have focused solely on the dispersion of 
fields without considering plot heterogeneity. Considering the observation that land 
consolidation programs have succeeded mostly in places with uniform soils but failed in 
places with heterogeneous soils (Heston and Kumar 1983; Mearns 1999; Niroula and 
Thapa 2005), it is reasonable to conjecture that the risk-reducing benefit of land 
fragmentation may be jointly determined by both plot dispersion and plot heterogeneity. 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we will provide a formal framework to characterize how land 
fragmentation affects both production efficiency and production risk, which is often 
measured by the variation in crop yield. The dominant approach to production efficiency 
analysis has been the stochastic frontier model, which was simultaneously developed by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). To begin, 
write the yield  (in its original unit) of farmer  ( =1, 2... ) as: 
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(2-2) .  
In (2-2),  is the deterministic production function where  is the input vector, 
including a constant term, and  is the corresponding parameter vector. The inefficiency 
term, , is assumed to be greater than or equal to zero (hence it is also known as the 
one-sided error term) such that  lies within the unit interval, representing the 
proportion of  that is actually produced. When , the production is 
completely efficient and lies right on the production frontier; otherwise, inefficiency 
exists and production lies below the frontier. Lastly, the term  contains the 
regular error term  (also known as the two-sided error term), which captures all 
random factors such as noise and model misspecification. By having two separate error 
terms, the stochastic frontier model, which is also called the compound error model, 
allows the estimation of a stochastic production frontier with individual-specific 
inefficiency.  
Empirical studies often focus on inputs and output in the logarithmic form and assume 
the deterministic production function after the logarithmic transformation, , to take 
either the Cobb-Douglas form or the transcendental logarithmic (translog) form. This 
study will take the translog assumption as the more general case. This transformation 
allows us to see the three components of  more clearly: 
(2-3) .  
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The primary interest of stochastic production frontier analysis falls on the inefficiency 
term , and more specific assumptions have been made about its distribution. With a 
truncated normal distribution for , Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) 
propose a model to parameterize the mean of the pre-truncated inefficiency distribution, 
, such that inefficiency could be explained by a group of exogenous variables , 
including a constant term, through a linear function. That is: 
(2-4)   
Where 
(2-5)   
The parameter vector  in (2-5), or the so-called inefficiency effects, is left to be 
estimated. We will adopt the truncated normal assumption on  for the purpose of this 
study. Further, the two-sided error  is always assumed to follow the normal 
distribution . Both  and  are often assumed to be independent of each other 
and  across observations.  
In the traditional single-error model, heteroscedasticity usually does not cause too much 
empirical trouble. In case of its presence, the coefficient estimates are still consistent 
although not efficient, and the problem can be easily fixed by using more robust 
estimation procedures. However, heteroscedasticity is a much more serious problem in 
stochastic frontier models and may lead to inconsistent estimates of the inefficiency 
effects, the parameters of primary interest. This is because estimation of the inefficiency 
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term is based upon residuals derived from the estimation of a frontier (Caudill et al. 
1995; Hadri 1999). Even worse, heteroscedasticity could be present in either or both of 
the one-sided error term  and the two-sided error term , and mis-specification of 
either variance term,  or , will result in inconsistent estimates (Hadri 1999). 
Therefore, a reliable stochastic frontier model demands a careful analysis of its two 
variance terms. 
As reviewed in the previous section, land fragmentation has long been suspected of 
being related to production risk.  In this study, we make the formal hypothesis that land 
fragmentation can diversify production risk onto separate land plots such that it reduces 
the risk on the entire farm. To see this, we follow a similar decomposition to the one 
used by Blarel et al. (1992) and rewrite the actual yield (in its original unit) on the th 
plot of the th farm by such that 
(2-6)   
In (2-6),  is the expected farm-level yield. The term  captures the plot-specific fixed 
effects that cause  to deviate from , such as soil attributes. For example, if certain 
plot is more fertile than the other plots on the same farm, the yield on this plot will tend 
to be higher than the average yield on the whole farm. As opposed to ,  is also plot-
specific but stochastic, and it may be associated with precipitation, insolation, wind, and 
other random factors that define the microclimatic environment on each plot (Bentley 
1987). In general the distribution of  should vary from plot to plot and hence we 
assume  and  for any . Finally,  captures all stochastic 
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effects that are uniquely distributed for any plot on any farm, such as measurement 
errors, and it is assumed that  and , for any  and . 
With such a decomposition, we are taking the production on the farm level as a portfolio 
of production on all individual plots, each of which has its own distribution of returns. 
To aggregate into the farm-level yield , we have 
(2-7)   
Since we are concerned with the farm-level risk, take variance of  to get 
(2-8)   
   
   
Firstly, the second term on the right-hand side of (2-8), , shows clearly that 
land fragmentation, measured by the Simpson Index, is negatively related to the yield 
variability on the whole farm by spreading out the common stochastic effects  across 
the plots. What is less obvious is the first term, , which is the aggregation of 
stochastic effects that are specific to each plot and whose effect on yield variability is 
generally unknown unless the distribution (or at least the variance) of each  is given. 
In general, we should expect  to be related to soil heterogeneity for reasons argued in 
Hung et al. (2007). Moreover, if we believe that farmers can match the growing 
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conditions on all plots with the proper crop portfolio as suggested by the high correlation 
between the two (Bellon and Taylor 1993; Hung 2006), we should expect  to be 
negatively associated with crop diversification given the latter’s evident role for risk 
reduction. 
In this way, we see that yield variability is not identical among all farms but is 
determined by several farm-specific factors, echoing our concern of heteroscedasticity. 
To be more specific, the variance of the common error term  should have its own 
explanatory variables; that is 
(2-9)   
where  will include a constant term, the Simpson Index and variables for plot 
heterogeneity and crop diversification. Further, some factors of production have been 
found to affect either or both variance terms, such as labor (Hadri et al. 2003). To avoid 
potential bias in the coefficient estimates, we retain the most general specification of  
at this step by allowing its own vector of determinants, , with the coefficient vector : 
(2-10)   
If heteroscedasticity is found to be absent from  by the empirical estimation,  will 
contain only a constant term as in the homoscedastic case. 
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2.4 Data and Context 
The data used for the empirical analysis come from the Tanzania National Panel Survey 
2008-2009 as part of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS)—Integrated 
Surveys on Agriculture project led by the World Bank. This survey adopted a stratified, 
multi-stage cluster design to obtain a nationally-representative sample. Rural family 
members were interviewed by team enumerators regarding their family socioeconomics 
and agricultural activities. Information such as location, ownership, soil conditions, crop 
varieties, input use and harvest was collected for each cultivated plot.  
For the purpose of this study, we will focus on plots that were grown either partially or 
fully with annual crops in the long rainy season (March, April and May) by realizing 
that the production of annual crops differs tremendously from that of perennial crops and 
trees. In this way, our sample contains 1,503 households with 2,756 plots; nearly half of 
the households cultivated only one plot and around 95 percent of households cultivated 
less than 4 plots (Table 2-1). Maize is the predominant crop in terms of either frequency 
or planting area, and other popular annual crops include beans, groundnuts, paddy rice, 
and sorghum. More background information and descriptive statistics for key variables 
will be presented below. 
In Tanzania, smallholder farming has been the predominant form of agriculture, which 
accommodated about 75 percent of the national population and accounted for about 45 
percent of the GDP in 2008. Although Tanzania has vast areas of cropland that are 
suitable for intensive cultivation, the use of inputs is limited and productivity is 
generally low. In 2008, 37 percent of the rural population, i.e. more than one fourth of 
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the total population, lived below the poverty line. Therefore, efficient and secure food 
production has significance for Tanzania's millions of impoverished rural citizens as 
well as its national economy. 
There is one particular issue of Tanzania's agriculture that is highly pertinent to the topic 
of this study -- land fragmentation. At the beginning of its independence, Tanzania 
adopted a communist approach and promoted collective land cultivation and shared 
labor for its agricultural production. An estimated 75% of the population were relocated 
from scattered homesteads and smallholdings to live in communal villages of 2,000-
4,000 residents (Dondeyne et al. 2003; Maoulidi 2004), even though there was a strong 
preference of farmers for individually allocated and individually cultivated farmland 
(USAID 2011).  
This approach was quickly abandoned by the following administration in the 1980s and 
a new legal framework was gradually installed to support private property rights and 
individualized control of farming. The law recognizes the rights to land and encourages 
productive and sustainable use of land. In principle, farmers have the rights to buy, sell, 
lease and mortgage their plots and decide on matters such as their crop choices and land 
use. More interestingly, farmers could have chosen to have a single-plot farm although 
most of them still keep multiple plots on their farms. By 2008, each rural household 
owned or cultivated an average of 2.5 plots. The shifts in Tanzania’s land tenure system 
in the past several decades may better address the underlying economic motivations of 
land fragmentation as investigated in this research.  
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2.5 Empirical Model 
Dependent Variable 
Among the households in our sample, nearly 70 percent grew more than one crop and 
the crop portfolio varied from farm to farm, rendering it difficult to compare production 
efficiency across farms using a yield frontier. Moreover, the lack of price data on hired 
labor makes it impossible to estimate the profits of crop production. Therefore, we use a 
revenue frontier for this study by implicitly assuming revenue-maximizing farmers. 
Specifically, the dependent variable of our empirical model is the logarithmic form of 
revenue per acre, which equals the aggregated value (in Tanzania shillings) of all crops 
grown on each farm divided by the farm area. In this survey, farmers were asked to 
estimate the value of their crops and the proportion of harvest finished by the time of the 
survey. Crop prices reported by village leaders are not adopted because of apparent 
anomalies and missing observations. 
Given that we are estimating a revenue frontier, the one-sided error term  now 
measures the revenue efficiency, which is defined as the ratio of actual revenue to 
maximum revenue. As opposed to the generic stochastic production frontier, where the 
dependent variable is output and  measures the technical efficiency, revenue efficiency 
to be measured in this study is one type of economic efficiency and hence consists of 
both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to the 
ability to combine inputs and/or outputs in optimal proportions stipulated by the first-
order optimality conditions in light of prevailing prices.  
 
20 
To illustrate the measurement and decomposition of revenue efficiency, we plot a 
revenue frontier1 for two outputs in Figure 2-1 and use Point A to represent an actual 
output combination. Point E on the revenue frontier maximizes the revenue at the 
relative output price W, which equals the slope of the price line. Now revenue 
inefficiency is represented by the vector difference between Point A and Point E. To 
decompose revenue efficiency into the two components of interest, we push Point A up 
to Point B on the revenue frontier by keeping the corresponding price lines parallel. The 
vector difference between Point A and Point B represents technical inefficiency since 
the radial movement from A to B fully employs output slackness given the output prices. 
The allocative inefficiency is then determined residually as the vector difference 
between Point B and Point E, which illustrates the deviation from the optimal output 
combination. Quantitatively speaking, the magnitudes of technical, allocative and 
revenue efficiency in this example are all measured by ratios of price-weighted output 
vectors. Hereby, we use the term (in)efficiency to denote revenue (in)efficiency unless 
otherwise noted. 
Explanatory Variables of the Revenue Frontier 
As stated earlier, farm area is calculated as the aggregated area for all annual crops and 
is included in the revenue function as an input. Besides land, labor is of utmost 
importance in Tanzanian agriculture. The LSMS survey documents labor days spent by 
family members and, if any, hired workers on each plot at three stages of production, 
1 Here we implicitly assume that the output sets are closed and convex and that outputs are freely 
disposable. 
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i.e., land preparation and planting, weeding, and harvesting, making it possible to 
differentiate labor spent on these activities as different inputs. For this study we add 
hired labor onto family labor for each activity and include in the inefficiency term (to be 
discussed below) the ratio of total hired labor to total family labor in order to control for 
the impact of labor heterogeneity on efficiency.  
Inputs other than labor and land, such as fertilizers, irrigation, herbicides and pesticides, 
have been rare in Tanzania (Panel 1, Table 2-2). Even fewer farmers have access, 
through either rental or possession, to draft animals (e.g., oxen) or farm machinery (e.g., 
tractor and thresher) although they may increase revenue significantly (Panel 2, Table 2-
2). Instead, the most common farm implement in Tanzania are hand hoes with all the 
households in our sample having at least one. In the empirical model, we will include the 
number of hand hoes per acre and a dummy variable for the use of any draft animal or 
machinery to control for their probable contribution to revenue. 
Variables for average temperature and precipitation of the wettest quarter rather than 
those of the whole year are included as inputs to account for weather’s impact on the 
agricultural production undertaken in the long rainy season2. Finally, our revenue 
2 As a matter of fact, the average number for all year around is highly correlated with the average number 
for the wettest season. This is the case for both temperature and precipitation with the correlation 
coefficients equal to 0.98 and 0.92 respectively. Switching to the yearly statistics will not lead to any 
essential changes in our major findings as confirmed by our sensitivity test on this. 
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frontier model contains a price index which equals the average price of all annual crops 
harvested on the farm weighted by their quantities (all in kilograms)3. 
Explanatory Variables of Inefficiency 
Land Fragmentation. Variables from this category are of primary interest in this study 
regarding the determination of efficiency. Table 2-3 lists the descriptive statistics of the 
various dimensions of land fragmentation. It shows that the majority of the farms in our 
sample have a relatively small size with a mean of 4.96 acres and 95 percent of them 
less than 15 acres. The average plot size of 2.70 acres is even smaller owing to the 
fragmentation of land on over half of the farms. Land fragmentation measured by the 
Simpson Index presents a clear bimodal distribution as a result of the large percentage of 
single-plot farms, while there exists only weak correlation between farm size and the 
Simpson Index. In terms of distance, about three fourths of the plots are located within 3 
kilometers (approximately 2 miles) from either home or road. Meanwhile, less than 40 
percent of the plots are within that distance from a nearby market. 
To estimate the inefficiency term in the model, we will include farm size, the Simpson 
Index, an interaction term between the two as well as the three distance variables (from 
plot to home, road and market, respectively). To account for the varying effects of land 
fragmentation on plots with different sizes, we calculate the average plot area and 
average distance variables weighted by plot size. It turns out that the weighted average 
3 We also tried generating an average crop price weighted by their contribution to total value and included 
it in the empirical model. All major findings remain the same except for the changes in the magnitude of 
coefficient estimates and therefore the inefficiency estimates and marginal effects. 
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plot area, a somewhat obscure concept, equals farm area minus its interaction term with 
the Simpson Index; hence there is no need to add it to the model. To see this connection, 
recall that the area for the th plot is denoted as then the weighted average plot area is 
by our definition derived as 
(2-11)   
Finally, the number of plots on each farm will be excluded from the model since it is 
already captured by the Simpson Index4. 
Household Characteristics. In a cross-section analysis like this one, household 
characteristics, especially those related to labor, usually help to explain the variation in 
efficiency across households. Here we adopt the average age and average education5 
(measured in school years) of family workers who actually worked in the fields instead 
of those of all family workers, some of whom may work in non-agricultural sectors. 
Labor days by male workers and labor days by hired workers as the respective 
proportion of the total labor days will also be included. 
4 Also, it will be difficult to interpret the marginal effects if we include both the Simpson Index and 
number of plots. 
5 Many studies choose to use the age and education of household head as a proxy for experience. 
However, as argued in Fuwa (2000) and others, there have been various definitions of household headship 
(e.g., demographics-based or economics-based) and the household head elicited in the common 
household-level surveys may not necessarily be the one that is most relevant to the economic analysis 
under many circumstances. Therefore, we believe the average age and education of family laborers who 
actually worked in the fields to be a better proxy variable of farming experience in this study. 
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Further, households will allocate their resources to activities other than the growing of 
annual crops, such as housework and perennial crops or fruit trees. With the information 
available, we will include the ratio of the number of children under the age of five to the 
number of family field workers and the ratio of farm area used for perennial crops/fruit 
trees to farm area used for annual crops to control for their potential negative impacts on 
efficiency. Table 2-4 in the appendix lists the descriptive statistics of these household 
characteristics variables. 
Soil Conditions. Using the geo-referenced homestead location data, the LSMS survey 
has imported soil and terrain data from the Harmonized World Soil Database at a 
resolution of 0.083degree (about 10 kilometer grids). The measures we choose to 
explain production efficiency are: nutrient availability, oxygen availability to roots, and 
workability for field management (Table 2-5). To include each of the measures in the 
estimation, we use "severe constraints" as the reference and create respective dummy 
variables for the other two categories, “Moderate constraints” and “No or slight 
constraint”, both of which expect a negative coefficient. 
Explanatory Variables for Heteroscedasticity 
Plot heterogeneity and Crop Diversification. As argued in the conceptual framework, 
the variance of yield is related to plot heterogeneity, crop diversification, and land 
fragmentation measured by the Simpson Index. In the LSMS survey, Tanzanian farmers 
are asked to report the soil type (sandy, loam, clay and others), erosion type (existent or 
not) and steepness of slope (flat bottom, flat top, slightly sloped and very steep) for each 
plot. Assuming that soil conditions can be jointly characterized by these three 
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dimensions, we use the number of different soil profiles normalized by the number of 
plots to compare plot heterogeneity across farms (Table 2-6). 
Nearly 70 percent of farms in our sample have diversified their crop portfolio by either 
growing more than one crop on single plot and/or growing different crops on different 
plots (Table 2-7). In this study, we simply use the number of different crops on the 
whole farm to account for its influence on revenue variance. 
Labor Inputs. Researchers have long emphasized the effects of various inputs on risk, 
and a convenient specification has been the Just-Pope production function, which 
incorporates inputs into both the mean and variance functions of output. Evidence 
regarding the role of certain inputs, especially labor, has been mixed. For example, Antle 
and Crissman (1990) find labor to be risk reducing while Villano and Fleming (2006) 
argue that labor increases output variability. Further, the variance of either or both the 
one-sided error and two-sided error in a stochastic frontier model may be associated with 
producers’ input use (Schmidt 1986; Hadri 1999; Hadri et al. 2003). Hadri et al. (2003) 
report that expenditure on labor and machinery by farms will increase variability in 
efficiency, whereas land area and fertilizer cost have the opposite effect. In this paper, 
we will divide the aggregated labor days for all three activities by farm area and put the 
ratio in the variance function. 
2.6 Estimation and Results 
We are estimating a stochastic production frontier with a group of exogenous 
explanatory variables for the inefficiency term. Moreover, heteroscedasticity may be 
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present in either or both variance terms. Instead of using the common two-step 
estimation approach which will generate biased estimates Wang and Schmit (2002)6, this 
study uses the simultaneous estimation package in Stata 12.0 developed by Belotti et al. 
(2012).  
 
Variance Structure 
The main challenge to the empirical estimation stems from the indeterminate effects of 
labor on the two variance terms. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) propose a procedure that 
starts with a model that incorporates heteroscedasticity in both error components and 
then test the homoscedasticity restriction that respective coefficient(s) equals to zero. 
For this study, we start with a model, named HUV, where labor inputs appear in both 
variance terms with the Simpson Index, and the measures of plot heterogeneity and crop 
diversification in the variance of the two-sided error term. Then we move on to the two 
single-heteroscedasticity specifications, denoted as HU and HV respectively, where 
either the one-sided-error variance (U) or the two-sided-error variance (V) has its own 
determinant(s). Since labor input may affect the two variance terms differently from the 
other three variables, estimates from two alternative specifications (HU_1 and HUV_1) 
are also derived for model comparisons. Finally, the homoscedasticity model is 
estimated with only a constant term for each variance, and it is denoted as HO hereafter.  
6 This estimation procedure has been operationalized in Stata 12 by Belotti et al. (2012). 
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Table 2-8 lists the variance coefficient estimates for the six models above. Since model 
HUV could be seen as the unrestricted model for the other five, the likelihood ratio test 
can be applied to make pairwise comparisons between HUV and each of the other five. 
It shows that HUV is preferred to HU, HV_1 and HO but not HV and HUV_1, the 
likelihood of which are close enough to that of HUV to reject the specification of HUV. 
Further, both the significance test of coefficient estimates and the likelihood dominance 
criterion (Pollak and Wales 1991), an approach to non-nested model selection, suggest 
that HV is preferable to HUV_1.  
To conclude this section, as far as heteroscedasticity is concerned, HV is the statistically 
preferred model where heteroscedasticity appears only in the two-sided error term with 
four explanatory variables: Simpson Index, labor input, plot heterogeneity, and crop 
diversification. Discussions in the next section will be based on the HV model unless 
otherwise noted. 
Hypothesis Tests 
Following from the previous section, we can see that the Simpson Index is negatively 
correlated with the two-sided error variance as predicted by the conceptual framework, 
and its coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level according to a two-tailed test. 
A similar result also holds for crop diversification, measured by the number of different 
crop types on the whole farm. In contrast, plot heterogeneity is found to have a positive 
impact on the variance although the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
This finding is not completely surprising given the close connection between plot 
heterogeneity and crop diversification. With a better characterization of plot 
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heterogeneity and its relationship with crop diversification, we may be able to derive its 
“net effect” on the variance in future work. Lastly, revenue variance increases with the 
labor input, a result in accordance with the risk-increasing role of labor found by many 
studies. 
Regarding the determinants of efficiency (Column 2, Table 2-9), we find that average 
education of family workers and proportion of male labor have the expected positive 
effects on efficiency, and the ratio of farm land devoted to perennial crops and fruit trees 
and average age of workers have the expected negative effects, and all these effects are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Meanwhile, the ratio of children under the age of 
five to the number of family workers does not seem to affect efficiency. Leaving out this 
variable will not impact the overall performance of the model as shown by the 
comparison between Column 3 and 2 in Table 2-9. This may be because over three 
fourths of families in our sample have only one young child or no child at all such that 
they place no big burden on family workers.  
What turns out to be puzzling is the effect of hired labor, and the results suggest that the 
higher the ratio of hired labor to the overall labor is, the more efficient the production 
will be. This contradicts the common belief that hired labor is less efficient than family 
labor since hired workers may lack enough farm-specific experience and is difficult to 
supervise (Feder 1985; Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). A potential explanation is 
that we are unable to include more variables related with hired labor such as their age 
and education, which are not reported in this survey. These variables will affect 
production efficiency as their counterparts for family labors and may be correlated with 
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hired labor ratio; hence excluding them from the regression will lead to omitted variable 
bias. 
Among the variables that are associated with soil conditions, the two for nutrient 
availability report positive coefficient estimates while neither of the estimates is 
statistically significant. An exclusion test (Column 4, Table 2-9) on the two variables 
shows that leaving them out from the model will not significantly change the estimates 
of other variables or the overall model fit. As for oxygen availability, the dummy 
representing the category of "Moderate constraint" is found to be negative at the 10% 
significance level, whereas the one for "No or slight constraint" is not significant, 
implying that soil of this type has the same effects on production efficiency as that of 
"Severe constraint". This unusual estimate may be caused by the lack of variation in our 
sample, as 90% observations report no or slight constraint (Table 2-5). Finally, both the 
two dummies for "Workability" report significantly negative coefficient estimates, and 
the difference in magnitude between the two estimates suggests that the less constraining 
the workability is, the more efficient the production would be, a conclusion that is 
consistent with our expectation. 
Our primary interest falls on the variables related to land fragmentation. The Simpson 
Index, the most popular measure in the literature, is found to have a significantly 
negative impact on inefficiency (Part 2, Table 2-9); in other words, the more fragmented 
the farm is, the more efficient the production. This relationship seems counterintuitive 
and contradicts the results in many other studies, although it is robust to various model 
specifications in this research. As for other dimensions of land fragmentation, neither of 
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them reports a statistically significant coefficient estimate on its own; however, they are 
jointly significant as can be seen from the results in Part 5 of Table 2-9. This finding 
echoes previous call for a complete characterization of land fragmentation to measure its 
economic effects.  
Finally for the production frontier, the coefficient estimates of various inputs are less 
relevant to our topic and are thus waived from discussion. The only thing worth noting 
here is that the use of ox or machinery in the production shows a significantly positive 
effect on revenue as expected. 
Efficiency Estimates and Marginal Effects 
Given the results from the significance tests, we estimate a parsimonious and also 
statistically preferable model of HV, HV_P, to derive estimates for mean inefficiency 
term or its opposite, the mean efficiency, for each farm. Since our production frontier is 
defined for the logarithms of revenue and inputs, those mean efficiency estimates are 
subject to a proper transformation before comprehensible economic interpretations could 
be reached. The estimator proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) is used to facilitate the 
calculation of marginal effects in the next step, although the results turn out to be very 
close to those using the alternative Battese and Coelli (1988)'s estimator (Table 2-10 and 
Figure 2-1). It can be seen that the average revenue efficiency across the 1,503 farms is 
0.42, implying that these farms realize, on average, 42 percent of the revenue of a fully 
efficient farm, i.e. one that has zero inefficiency. Table 2-10 also shows the wide gap 
between the most efficient farms and those least efficient ones. This is consistent with 
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our knowledge of agricultural production in Tanzania, where the productivity is low and 
varies tremendously across its many agro-ecological zones (USAID 2011). 
Using the convenient estimates of efficiency from the last step, we are able to derive the 
farm-specific marginal effects as presented in Table 2-11. For example, if the average 
education of labor is increased by one year, it can add 0.75 percentage points on average 
to the existing efficiency; if farmers can update the workability of his land from "Severe 
Constraints", the reference category for the regression, to "No or Slight Constraints", 
they can expect the efficiency to grow by 10.13 percentage points.  
As for the Simpson Index, the estimated mean marginal effect suggests that if all the 
plots are consolidated into one, i.e. the Index goes from one to zero, the efficiency will 
be reduced by 12.20 percentage points. Since a Simpson Index equal to one refers to the 
infinite fragmentation case, which is practically impossible, a more meaningful 
interpretation of its marginal effect would be a proposed consolidation from its current 
state. Recall that our sample contains 2,756 plots from 1,503 farms. The average value 
of the Simpson Index equals  about 0.25 and the estimated average efficiency score of 
42 percent. If all the multi-plot farms are consolidated into single-plot farms, then the 
mean Simpson Index would be zero and the new average efficiency score will drop by 
three percentage points to 39 percent, i.e., a 7.2 percent decrease from its current level. 
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Finally for a robustness check, we try more specifications of the empirical model, such 
as using aggregated labor instead of three separate labor inputs or using alternative 
measure of crop diversification, and find no substantial changes to our major findings7. 
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
To investigate the role of land fragmentation in agricultural production, this study 
applies a stochastic frontier model with heteroscedasticity to the Tanzania LSMS data 
and finds robust evidence to support the hypothesis that land fragmentation may reduce 
production risk as measured by revenue variability. This finding is consistent with the 
few empirical studies that have addressed the risk-reduction effect of land 
fragmentation, such as McCloskey (1976), Blarel et al. (1992), and Goland (1993). 
Moreover, we emphasize the necessity of including plot heterogeneity in characterizing 
land fragmentation and more importantly, quantitatively measuring its effects on 
revenue by showing how revenue variability is jointly determined by the two factors and 
the closely associated crop diversification.  This may explain the curious observations 
made by Heston and Kumar (1983) and Niroula and Thapa (2005) that land 
consolidation programs have succeeded mostly in places with uniform soils but failed in 
places with heterogeneous soils.  
7 Since the primary model includes the Simpson Index in both the mean inefficiency function and the risk 
function, there may be concerns over the identification of this variable. To address this issue, we conduct 
sensitivity tests by excluding the Simpson Index from either of the two functions at a time. In either case, 
the model is identifiable and reports coefficients estimates similar to the primary findings in terms of sign 
of direction, magnitude, and statistical significance.   
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Meanwhile, our analysis suggests that land fragmentation may be efficiency enhancing 
by increasing the revenue per unit of land, leaving it instrumental to farmers in terms of 
both efficiency and risk management (we dub this result “double dividends”), a finding 
that contradicts those of many studies in the literature but not all. For example, a few 
studies have found either a statistically insignificant (e.g. Blarel et al. 1992; Di Falco et 
al. 2010) or economically insignificant (e.g., Wan and Cheng 2001) effect of land 
fragmentation. On the other hand, our result is not without companions in the literature. 
Deininger et al. (2012) apply the stochastic frontier model to the LSMS survey data of 
Albania and find land fragmentation measured by number of plots has a statistically 
significant positive effect on technical efficiency although the authors suggest that this 
positive economic impact is small (Page 13)8. An even more interesting observation has 
been made by Niroula and Thapa (2007), who report that in Nepal parcels with smaller 
size resulted from land fragmentation see more labor inputs and a higher yield. They 
further argued that “land fragmentation has a rather positive impact on production… 
However … the higher crop yield from small parcels is attributed to the application of 
considerably higher amount of labor, fertilizers and compost.” Yet they did not give any 
clue on whether or how input intensity is connected with land fragmentation. 
8 Their study also investigates land fragmentation’s impact on farmers’ cropland abandonment decisions. 
They found that about 10 percent of Albania’s productive land has been left idle mostly because of land 
market imperfections. In contrast, there are only a few cases of land abandonment where land 
fragmentation leads to plots too small for economically viable cultivation. Among those currently 
cultivated plots, land fragmentation is found to have a statistically significant positive effect on efficiency. 
Although their study does not give an overall appraisal of land fragmentation when both cultivation-
related and abandonment-related productivity are considered, they conclude that their analysis does not 
support the argument of land fragmentation undermining productivity. 
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To provide one possible explanation to Niroula and Thapa’s unanswered question and 
the puzzling positive relationship between land fragmentation and production efficiency 
found in this paper and Deininger et al. (2012), we argue that an important component 
has been absent from this study and similar studies – risk preference, which could play a 
pivotal role in interpreting land fragmentation and its effects. As observed by most 
studies, farmers generally show aversion toward risk in agricultural production, a 
preference which can preclude them from using as many inputs as they would under risk 
neutrality and thus lead to a reduced yield or revenue. It can be anticipated that a shift in 
production risk, such as the one caused by land fragmentation as corroborated by this 
study, would result in changes in input use decisions, which will ultimately affect 
economic performance. An improved analytical framework that accommodates risk, 
efficiency and risk preference should improve our understanding of land fragmentation’s 
role in agricultural production. 
Despite the counterintuitive impact of land fragmentation on efficiency, this study still 
generates sufficient implications for future land reforms. First and foremost, land 
fragmentation as a tool for farmers to manage risk should be recognized. By utilizing the 
heterogeneous growing conditions, land fragmentation can spread out risk onto separate 
plots and reduce the revenue variability on the whole farm. This aspect is of special 
significance to farmers with no or limited access to crop insurance to secure their 
agricultural income. Second, the vast differences in farm structure, agricultural 
productivity and farming traditions warn against any hasty generalization on 
fragmentation and once-and-for-all consolidation propositions. In a smallholding and 
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traditional agriculture like the Tanzanian case, the small plot size and rare use of 
machinery can minimize the potential negative effects of land fragmentation, while it 
may become a more serious issue for places with a more mechanized agriculture such as 
Japan9.
9 According to Kawasaki (2010) who finds that land fragmentation reduces the cost efficiency of Japanese 
rice growing, the average farm size in his sample is about 6.8 acres, roughly comparable to the 6.1 acres 
among the Tanzanian farmers in our sample when area used for perennial crops and trees is also counted. 
In contrast to the Tanzanian case, in Japan the planting and harvesting is done mostly with small 
machines. Large machines are hardly used because they cannot maneuver around in small plots and need 
long tracts of uniform land to do the job efficiently (Hays 2009). 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 2-1 An Illustration of Revenue Efficiency 
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Table 2-1 Households by Number of Plots 
 
No. of Plots  
per Household Frequency Percent 
Cumulative  
Percent 
1 687 45.71 45.71 
2 514 34.20 79.91 
3 215 14.30 94.21 
4 55 3.66 97.87 
5 25 1.66 99.53 
6 4 0.27 99.80 
8 1 0.07 99.87 
9 1 0.07 99.93 
10 1 0.07 100.00 
Total 1,503 100.00  
Source: Developed by author. 
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Table 2-2 Use of Advanced Inputs 
 
Panel 1: Other inputs (N=2,756) 
Inputs No. of Plots Percent 
Irrigation 83 3.01 
Organic Fertilizer 332 12.05 
Inorganic Fertilizer 416 15.09 
Herbicide/Pesticide 308 11.18 
 
 
Panel 2: Draft animals and machinery (N=1,503) 
Inputs No. of Households Percent 
Hand Hoe 1,503 100.00 
Ox Plough 128 8.52 
Ox Seeder 143 9.51 
Ox Cart 1 0.07 
Tractor 42 2.79 
Mechanical Plough 3 0.20 
Mechanical Harrow 6 0.40 
Thresher 1 0.07 
Source: Developed by author. 
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Table 2-3 Descriptive Statistics of Dimensions of Land Fragmentation 
 
 Unit No. of 
Obs. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
 
     
Farm Area Acre 1,503  4.96 2.5 11.88  
Number of Plots 1 2,756  1.83 2 1.01  
Plot Area Acre 2,756  2.70 1 12.78  
Simpson Index 1 1,503  0.25 0.20 0.26  
Distance, plot to home Kilometer 2,755  3.12 1.5 6.44  
Distance, plot to road Kilometer 2,755  1.91 1 3.02  
Distance, plot to market Kilometer 2,773  7.78 5 9.03  
 
Source: Developed by author. 
Note: One acre ≈ 0.405 hectares or 0.0015625 square miles; one kilometer ≈ 0.621 miles. 
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Table 2-4 Descriptive Statistics of Household Characteristics 
 
(N=1,503) 
 Mean Median S.D. 
 
 
Area ratio 0.050 0 0.245  
Average age 36.499 32.667 13.577  
Average education  4.740 5 2.665  
Male labor proportion 0.470 0.50 0.255  
Child ratio 0.368 0.25 0.456  
Hired labor proportion 0.092 0 0.174  
Source: Developed by author. 
Notes: 
1. Average age and average education are measured in years; the other four variables are 
measured on a scale of zero to one. 
2. Average age and average education are for family workers only. If certain family use only 
hired labor, the average age and average education are reported with a value of zero. 
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Table 2-5 Soil Variables 
 
 Nutrient Availability  
Oxygen Availability to 
Roots  Workability 
Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No or Slight 
Constraint 
498 33.13  1,344 89.42  850 56.55 
Moderate 
Constraint 838 55.76  124 8.25  421 28.01 
Severe 
Constraint 
167 11.11  35 2.33  232 15.44 
Total 1,503 100.00  1,503 100.00  1,503 100.00 
Source: Developed by author. 
Notes: The following definitions of variables are adapted from the Harmonized World Soil 
Database accessible at: http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/External-World-soil-
database/HTML/SoilQuality.html?sb=10 
1. Nutrient availability is decisive for successful low level input farming and to some extent 
also for intermediate input levels.  
2. Oxygen availability in soils is largely defined by drainage characteristics of soils. 
3. Workability or ease of tillage depends on interrelated soil characteristics such as texture, 
structure, organic matter content, soil consistence/bulk density, the occurrence of gravel or 
stones in the profile or at the soil surface, and the presence of continuous hard rock at shallow 
depth as well as rock outcrops. For the variable of workability, we combine “Severe 
Constraint”, “Very Severe Constraint” and “Mainly Non-Soil” into one category called 
“Severe Constraint”. 
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Table 2-6 Plot heterogeneity 
 
No. of plots No. of different soil profiles Total 1 2 3 4 5 
1 687 0 0 0 0 687 
2 166 348 0 0 0 514 
3 51 98 66 0 0 215 
4 11 22 17 5 0 55 
5 3 4 10 7 1 25 
6 0 2 2 0 0 4 
8 0 1 0 0 0 1 
9 0 0 1 0 0 1 
10 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 918 475 96 13 1 1,503 
 
Source: Developed by author. 
 
 Table 2-7 Crop Diversification by Number of Plots 
 
Panel a: Number of commodities 
No. of plots No. of Crop Varieties Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 359 215 76 25 9 3 0 687 
2 90 234 120 52 13 5 0 514 
3 21 65 79 36 8 3 3 215 
4 2 20 15 12 5 1 0 55 
5 1 7 9 4 4 0 0 25 
6 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 4 
8 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 473 545 300 131 39 12 3 1,503 
 
Panel b: Major commodities 
 One-plot farms Two-plot farms Three-plot farms Other farms All farms 
 Area Percent Area Percent Area Percent Area Percent Area Percent 
Maize 564.41 24.88 972 31.39 926.95 38.15 770.81 36.18 3234.17 32.58 
Groundnut 19.5 0.86 81.1 2.62 335.71 13.82 245.63 11.53 681.94 6.87 
Beans 31.43 1.39 255.02 8.24 202.05 8.32 167.18 7.85 655.68 6.61 
Paddy rice 100.46 4.43 176.69 5.71 132.48 5.45 101.39 4.76 511.02 5.15 
Sorghum 17.88 0.79 82.43 2.66 173.69 7.15 146.63 6.88 420.63 4.24 
Cotton 28.75 1.27 119.25 3.85 136.05 5.60 79.25 3.72 363.3 3.66 
Cassava 34.85 1.54 49.63 1.60 16.32 0.67 16.25 0.76 117.05 1.18 
Others 1471.68 64.86 1360.57 43.94 506.52 20.85 603.43 28.32 3942.2 39.72 
Sum 2268.96 100.00 3096.69 100.00 2429.77 100.00 2130.57 100.00 9925.99 100.00 
Source: Developed by author. 
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Table 2-8 Comparison of Various Variance Structures 
 
 HUV HV HU HO HUV_1 HV_1 
One-sided error (U) variance  
Labor 
intensity 
-0.000429  -8.90E-05  -0.000338  
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant 
-0.882*** -0.904*** -0.1 -0.104 -0.934*** -0.0293 
(0.277) (0.302) (0.283) (0.286) (0.304) (0.306) 
Two-sided error (V) variance  
Simpson 
index 
-0.512* -0.497*   -0.535*  
(0.295) (0.295)   (0.295)  
Labor 
intensity 
0.000178* 0.000187*    0.000222** 
(0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) 
Plot 
heterogeneity 
0.16 0.161   0.18  
(0.323) (0.323)   (0.322)  
Crop 
diversification 
-0.231* -0.223*   -0.227*  
(0.125) (0.132)   (0.129)  
Constant -0.305 -0.325 -0.852*** -0.852*** -0.28 -0.891*** (0.356) (0.352) (0.101) (0.101) (0.354) (0.101) 
No. of 
observations 1,503 1,503 1,503 1,503 1,503 1,503 
Log 
likelihood -1,877.20 -1,877.75 -1,891.83 -1,892.06 -1,878.57 -1,889.50 
Degree of 
freedom N.A. 1 4 5 1 4 
2*(LR1-LR2) N.A. 1.096 29.258 29.712 2.745 24.598 
Critical value 
(10%) N.A. 2.71 7.78 9.24 2.71 7.78 
Critical value 
(5%) N.A. 3.84 9.49 11.07 3.84 9.49 
Source: Developed by author. 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2. Estimates of the revenue frontier and the mean inefficiency function are omitted from here for 
presentation clarity. 
3. All the statistics for the Likelihood Ratio tests are calculated from the pairwise comparisons 
between the corresponding models with model HUV. 
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Table 2-9 Hypothesis Tests 
 
Part 1: Revenue Frontier Function 
Variables HV HV_1 HV_2 HV_P 
     
Labor1*Labor1 -0.00951 -0.00985 -0.00958 -0.00515 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
Labor1*Labor2 -0.0686 -0.0662 -0.0672 -0.0818* 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Labor1*Labor3 0.0731** 0.0702* 0.0702* 0.0713* 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Labor1*Area -0.085 -0.0845 -0.0833 -0.0741 
 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Labor1*Price -0.0275 -0.0284 -0.0298 -0.0233 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Labor1*Precipitation 0.0114 0.0122 0.0118 0.0036 
 
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Labor1*Temperature 0.0454 0.0453 0.047 0.0518 
 
(0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
Labor1*Hoes -0.104 -0.102 -0.102 -0.106 
 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Labor2*Labor2 0.00537 0.00303 0.00292 0.00808 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Labor2*Labor3 0.0441 0.0454 0.0461 0.0464 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Labor2*Area -0.033 -0.0378 -0.0348 -0.0234 
 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Labor2*Price -0.0696 -0.0681 -0.0664 -0.0692 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Labor2*Precipitation 0.00577 0.00373 0.00607 0.0148 
 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) 
Labor2*Temperature 0.076 0.0776 0.0731 0.0658 
 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
Labor2*Hoes 0.0241 0.0218 0.0252 0.0352 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Labor3*Labor3 -0.0893*** -0.0875*** -0.0879*** -0.0900*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Labor3*Area 0.0205 0.0219 0.0216 0.0218 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Labor3*Price -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.113*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
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Labor3*Precipitation -0.0138 -0.0132 -0.0128 -0.0151 
 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
Labor3*Temperature 0.187* 0.186* 0.186* 0.190* 
 
(0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Labor3*Hoes 0.0679 0.0658 0.0653 0.0725 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Area*Area 0.113* 0.110* 0.109* 0.0653 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.060) 
Area*Price -0.0863 -0.0855 -0.0848 -0.0821 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Area*Precipitation 0.317** 0.321** 0.314** 0.314** 
 
(0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
Area*Temperature -0.285* -0.289* -0.284* -0.283* 
 
(0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) 
Area*Hoes 0.281** 0.280** 0.275** 0.227* 
 
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) 
Price*Price 0.0326** 0.0331** 0.0331** 0.0347** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Price*Precipitation -0.284*** -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.288*** 
 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) 
Price*Temperature 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.480*** 0.477*** 
 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) 
Price*Hoes 0.0029 0.00375 0.00384 0.0139 
 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) 
Precipitation*Precipitation 0.118 0.107 0.122 0.107 
 
(0.168) (0.167) (0.163) (0.163) 
Precipitation*Temperature -0.0499 -0.0233 -0.0576 -0.019 
 
(0.402) (0.400) (0.390) (0.391) 
Precipitation*Hoes 0.306** 0.309** 0.305** 0.302** 
 
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) 
Temperature*Temperature -0.322 -0.337 -0.318 -0.343 
 
(0.267) (0.265) (0.261) (0.262) 
Temperature*Hoes -0.363** -0.367** -0.364** -0.368** 
 
(0.180) (0.179) (0.179) (0.180) 
Hoes*Hoes 0.142* 0.143** 0.140* 0.117 
 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) 
Dummy 0.339*** 0.340*** 0.345*** 0.351*** 
 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Constant 12.02*** 11.94*** 11.97*** 12.10*** 
 
(0.741) (0.721) (0.715) (0.712) 
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Part 2: Mean Inefficiency Function 
Variables HV HV_1 HV_P HV_2 
 
  
   Area Ratio 0.359*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.387** 
 
(0.135) (0.141) (0.144) (0.150) 
Average Age 0.00528** 0.00616** 0.00607** 0.00626** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Average Education -0.0265** -0.0278* -0.0283* -0.0323** 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Male Labor Ratio -0.401*** -0.420*** -0.425*** -0.395** 
 
(0.142) (0.153) (0.156) (0.160) 
Child Ratio -0.0821 
   
 
(0.071) 
   Hired Labor Ratio -1.500*** -1.625*** -1.673*** -1.779*** 
 
(0.527) (0.565) (0.586) (0.688) 
Nutrient Availability 0.00338 -0.00461 
  -- No Constraint (0.114) (0.122) 
  Nutrient Availability 0.0679 0.0643 
  -- Moderate Constraint (0.101) (0.108) 
  O2 Availability to Roots -0.316 -0.342 -0.357 -0.370 
--No Constraint (0.205) (0.217) (0.220) (0.238) 
O2 Availability to Roots -0.415* -0.445* -0.475* -0.459* 
--Moderate Constraint (0.235) (0.252) (0.256) (0.269) 
Field Workability -0.367*** -0.395*** -0.380*** -0.377*** 
--No Constraint (0.126) (0.135) (0.131) (0.141) 
Field Workability -0.252** -0.277** -0.261** -0.252** 
--Moderate Constraint (0.116) (0.126) (0.124) (0.128) 
Farm Area 0.0047 0.00522 0.006 
 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 Farm Area* SI 0.00409 0.00382 0.003 
 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 SI -0.425** -0.454** -0.457** -0.350** 
 
(0.166) (0.182) (0.183) (0.174) 
Distance to Home -0.0189 -0.0218 -0.023 
 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
 Distance to Road 0.00507 0.00699 0.008 
 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
 Distance to Market -0.00901 -0.0103 -0.011 
 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
 Constant 2.026*** 1.953*** 1.978*** 1.847*** 
 
(0.295) (0.288) (0.272) (0.266) 
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Part 3: One-sided Error Variance Function 
Variables HV HV_1 HV_P HV_2 
     
Constant -0.904*** -0.848*** -0.844*** -0.825** 
 
(0.302) (0.317) (0.324) (0.372) 
 
Part 4: Two-sided Error Variance Function 
Variables HV HV_1 HV_P HV_2 
     
SI -0.497* -0.481* -0.476* -0.468 
 
(0.295) (0.292) (0.289) (0.292) 
Labor Intensity 0.000187* 0.000190** 0.000189** 0.000244*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Plot Heterogeneity 0.161 0.138 0.126  0.148  
 
(0.323) (0.309) (0.304) (0.305) 
Crop Diversification -0.223* -0.208* -0.206* -0.203* 
 
(0.132) (0.117) (0.114) (0.110) 
Constant -0.325 -0.324 -0.306 -0.331 
 
(0.352) (0.344) (0.339) (0.342) 
 
Part 5: Statistics and Tests 
Variables HV HV_1 HV_P HV_2 
Observations 1,503 1,503 1,503 1,503 
Log Likelihood  -1,877.750 -1,878.399 -1,878.886 -1,885.590 
Degree of freedom 0 1 2 5 
2*(LR1-LR2) 0 1.298 0.9734 13.4088 
Critical value (10%) 2.71 2.71 4.61 6.25 
Critical value (5%) 3.84 3.84 5.99 7.81 
Source: Developed by author. 
Notes:  
1. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
2. Labor1: Labor days used for land preparation and planting per acre, in the log form; 
Labor2: Labor days used for weeding per acre, in the log form; 
Labor3: Labor days used for harvest per acre, in the log form; 
Area: Total area planted with annual crops, in the log form; 
Price: Crop price index weighted by quantity (in kilograms), in the log form; 
Precipitation: Precipitation of the wettest quarter, in the log form; 
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Temperature: Average temperature of the wettest quarter, in the log form; 
Hoes: Average number of hand hoes used per acre, in the log form; 
Dummy=1 if any ox or machinery ever used, =0 otherwise; 
Area Ratio: Ratio of farm area planted with perennial crops/trees to area planted with annual 
crops; 
Age: Average age of family workers in the fields; 
Education: Average number of years in school of family workers in the fields; 
Male Labor Ratio: Ratio of labor days by male workers to labor days by both genders; 
Hoes Ratio: Ratio of number of hoes to number of family workers in the fields; 
Child Ratio: Ratio of number of children under age of 5 to the number of family workers in the 
fields; 
Hired Labor Ratio: Ratio of labor days by hired workers to days by both family and hired 
workers; 
SI: the Simpson Index for land fragmentation; 
Distance to Home/Road/Market: weighted by plot area; 
Labor Intensity: Total labor days for all three activities per acre, i.e. Labor1+Labor2+Labor3; 
Plot heterogeneity: Number of different soil profiles across the farm, normalized by number of 
plots; 
Crop Diversification: Number of different annual crop varieties grown on the entire farm. 
3. All the statistics for the Likelihood Ratio tests are calculated from the pairwise comparison of 
the corresponding model with the preceding model. 
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Table 2-10 Descriptive Statistics of Efficiency Score Estimates 
 
 
No. of 
Obs. Mean S.D. Minimum 
1st 
Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile Maximum 
Jondrow et al. 
(1982) estimator 
1,503 0.42 0.16 0.03 0.29 0.40 0.53 0.90 
Battese & Coelli 
(1988) estimator 1,503 0.45 0.16 0.03 0.32 0.44 0.57 0.91 
Source: Developed by author. 
 
51 
 
 
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
x
kdensity eff_1 kdensity eff_2
 
Source: Developed by author. 
Note: Kernel density eff_1 is derived using the Jondrow et al. (1982) estimator, and kernel 
density eff_2 is derived using the Battese & Coelli (1988) estimator. 
 
Figure 2-2 Distributions of Inefficiency Estimates 
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Table 2-11 Marginal Effects on Efficiency 
 
(N=1,503, in percentage points) 
 Direction of Effect Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Area Ratio Negative 0.96 22.23 10.11 9.97 
Average Age Negative 0.02 0.36 0.16 0.16 
Average Education Positive 0.07 1.66 0.75 0.74 
Male Labor Proportion Positive 1.08 24.94 11.34 11.18 
Hired Labor Proportion Positive 4.26 98.22 44.64 44.04 
O2 Availability to Roots 
--No Constraint Positive 0.91 20.97 9.53 9.40 
O2 Availability to Roots 
--Moderate Constraint 
Positive 1.21 27.88 12.67 12.50 
Field Workability 
--No Constraint Positive 0.97 22.29 10.13 9.99 
Field Workability 
--Moderate Constraint 
Positive 0.66 15.32 6.96 6.87 
Farm Area Negative 0.01 0.32 0.15 0.15 
Farm Area * SI Negative 0.01 0.20 0.09 0.09 
SI Positive 1.16 26.84 12.20 12.03 
Distance to Home Positive 0.06 1.33 0.61 0.60 
Distance to Road Negative 0.02 0.46 0.21 0.21 
Distance to Market Positive 0.03 0.64 0.29 0.29 
Source: Developed by author. 
Note: Variable definitions are the same as those in Table 2-8.  
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Chapter 3. Land Fragmentation, Risk Preferences, and Production 
Efficiency 
3.1 Introduction 
Over time, land fragmentation in agriculture has been observed in many places around 
the world, whereas there is still an ongoing debate over its advantages, disadvantages, 
and implications for agricultural production and land policies. This paper looks into the 
contradictory evidence on how land fragmentation would affect production efficiency 
and aims to improve our understanding of farmers’ production decisions under risk and 
uncertainty. 
In principle, land fragmentation is believed to be a hurdle to agricultural productivity or 
profitability for a multitude of reasons. For example, multi-plot farms may suffer from 
extra losses of arable land or harvest on the corners and boundaries compared to single-
plot farms (Binns 1950; Blarel et al. 1992; Hung and MacAulay 2002). Also, the spatial 
dispersion of plots requires extra labor time for commuting between plots and the 
homestead and travel between different plots, making farm production less efficient or 
more costly (Richardson 1974; Blarel et al. 1992; Tan et al. 2008). Last but not least, 
land fragmentation has been often accused of prohibiting the use of large-scale 
investment such as machinery and irrigation as a result of the reduced size and irregular 
plot shape (Johnston 1972; Bentley 1987; Hung et al. 2007).  
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Despite the obvious disadvantages in many aspects, there has been mixed evidence 
regarding land fragmentation’s impact on agricultural productivity or efficiency. While 
the majority of the related studies find that it undermines efficiency and lowers 
profitability (e.g., Jabarin and Epplin 1994; Nguyen et al. 1996; Fan and Chan-Kang 
2005; Tan et al. 2008), a few studies have found either statistically insignificant (e.g., 
Blarel et al. 1992; Di Falco et al. 2010) or economically insignificant (e.g. Wan and 
Cheng 2001) effects of land fragmentation. More curiously, several recent studies have 
shown that in some cases more fragmented farms are associated with a higher yield once 
other factors, e.g., soil attributes and household characteristics, are accounted for. For 
example, Deininger et al. (2012) apply a stochastic frontier model to the Albanian 
household survey data and find land fragmentation measured by number of plots has a 
positive effect on efficiency. Using a similar framework but with Tanzanian household 
data and accounting for the risk effects, Rao (2014) reaches a similar conclusion and 
finds the results to be robust to various model specifications.  
The positive relationship between land fragmentation and production efficiency may 
seem rather odd on the surface given its obvious shortcomings. However, Niroula and 
Thapa (2007) made an interesting observation that in Nepal plots with smaller size 
resulting from land fragmentation see more labor inputs and a higher yield. They argued 
that land fragmentation has a positive impact on production although the higher crop 
yield is directly attributed to the application of considerably higher amount of labor. If 
their argument is justified, land fragmentation will affect production efficiency in 
opposite directions, leaving the sign of the net effect indeterminate. 
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One potential explanation for how land fragmentation can lead to more intense labor 
input (and other inputs) is the heterogeneous soil quality and growing conditions, or plot 
heterogeneity, as a result of the spatial farm dispersion. Farmers can take advantage of 
plot heterogeneity to diversify the crop portfolio and smooth out their labor use over 
time, thus increasing their labor inputs per unit of land especially when the labor 
available is abundant relative to the arable land. However, the positive relationship 
between land fragmentation and production efficiency is often reported when soil quality 
and/or crop diversification are accounted for (e.g., Deininger et al. 2012; Rao 2014). An 
alternative explanation may come from the related discussion on the inverse relationship 
between farm size and productivity. A key argument10 in that literature is that the market 
failure of multiple factors such as labor and credit (Barrett et al. 2010; Ali and Deininger 
2014; etc.) will encourage smallholding farmers to use more inputs, especially labor, per 
unit of land. However, market failure is unlikely to explain the differences in efficiency 
between farms of the same size but with different levels of fragmentation, i.e., having 
different numbers of plots. 
In this study, we aim to provide an alternative explanation to the curious positive 
relationship between land fragmentation and production efficiency. The key argument is 
that, in addition to its probable negative impacts on technical efficiency, land 
10 Some studies take this inverse relationship as a spurious one for either statistical reason (i.e., 
measurement errors) or methodological reason (i.e., exclusion of soil quality variables). Most recent 
studies, however, have shown more robust evidence to support the inverse relationship (Barret et al. 2010, 
Ali and Deninger 2014, etc.). Here in this study we tend to believe that this relationship exists as most 
studies have argued. 
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fragmentation may also affect how farmers would choose their optimal input use, i.e., 
the allocative efficiency, through its impacts on production risk. The chance is that 
allocative efficiency could either be increased or decreased, depending on how farmers 
adjust their input use, a decision which further depends on farmers’ risk preferences. 
Therefore, the direction of overall efficiency, which is comprised of both technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency, is indeterminate.  
The most common methodologies used in the related literature include the stochastic 
production function approach and the stochastic frontier approach. The former does not 
directly embrace the measure of efficiency while the latter measures only technical 
efficiency. Moreover, both approaches fail to account for risk preferences, an essential 
element in analyzing farmers’ production decisions. The following sections of this paper 
will introduce a framework that incorporates risk preferences into efficiency analysis 
and shows how failing to do so can result in misleading conclusions. The findings in this 
study are expected to contribute to the discussion on the immediate topic of land 
fragmentation, as well as efficiency analysis. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
We start with a Just-Pope production function which incorporates a stochastic technical 
inefficiency term  in the multiplicative form: 
(3-1)   
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The stochastic error term  is often assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, 
while the inefficiency term  is assumed to be non-negative such that  is less 
than or equal to one. At the efficiency frontier ( , the mean output function and 
output variance function are derived respectively as follows:  
(3-2)   
(3-3) Var(   
For simplicity, we call  the risk function given that its square equals output 
variance. Note that  may be a function of some or all the elements in the input vector 
 as well as some variables  that are exogenous to production.  
As opposed to the additive form where the inefficiency  is first added to the stochastic 
error term  and then multiplied by the risk function, the multiplicative form used in this 
study allows both technical efficiency ( ) and technical inefficiency ( ) to be defined 
independently of input quantities, a standard feature of the stochastic frontier model 
proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Battese and Coelli (1977). To see 
this,  and  can be derived from their definitions: 
(3-4) 
 
 
and 
(3-5) 
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Further, if we assume that  approximates  quite well as the literature 
usually does,  and . In this way, the term  can be conveniently 
interpreted as the proportion of potential output that is actually being produced and we 
can focus on the distribution of  instead of its exponential form. Finally, given the 
output price  and input price vector , we can write the profit  as  
(3-6)   
Now we assume that the objective is to maximize the expected utility of profit generated 
from the given production function, i.e., , where  is assumed to be a 
continuous and differentiable utility function. Since the expected utility function is 
unique up to an affine transformation, we normalize the profit by the output price  and 
denote the normalized input price vector by . Hence, the first-order condition for each 
variable input  ( ) is derived as 
(3-7)   
where , , , 
, and  is the departure from the first-order optimality 
condition, representing allocative inefficiency associated with input . Using a second-
order Taylor-series approximation of  at , Kumbhakar (2002) derives 
the following expressions for  and : 
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(3-8) 
 
 
and  
(3-9) 
 
In the two expressions above, a, b and c are the first three central moments associated 
with the distribution of the inefficiency term . That is, , , and 
 Moreover,  is the Arrow-
Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion,   is the 
measure of downside risk aversion, and  and  have the following relationship: 
(3-10) 
 
 
In this way, Kumbhakar’s approach allows the characterization of risk preferences 
alongside production risk without assuming an explicit functional form for utility as is 
commonly done in the literature. Now it is easy to see that the optimal use of inputs 
dictated by the conditions in (3-6) is jointly determined by input prices ( ), production 
technology , production risk ( , , , and ), and risk preferences (  and 
). In other words, given the observed use of inputs, it is possible to infer a farmer’s 
risk preferences. 
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In the context of land fragmentation, it is found to directly influence both production 
efficiency and production risk. One motivation of this study is to investigate how a shift 
in an exogenous factor to agricultural production, such as land fragmentation, can affect 
the optimal use of inputs and further affect yield and production risk. In mathematical 
terms, we are interested in the sign and magnitude of the following terms: 
(3-11) 
 
 
 
and 
(3-12) 
 
 
The two expressions above show that the net effect of an exogenous factor  on the 
expected yield (or yield variability) is jointly determined by its direct effect on  (or 
 and the indirect effect through the optimal use of input . It is clear that the 
sign of the net effect may not be necessarily the same as that of the direct effect. 
3.3 Numerical Examples 
To numerically examine the relationship among variables of interest, it is necessary to 
make assumptions on the functional form and the distribution of the inefficiency term . 
First for the deterministic production function , labor  is assumed to be the only 
variable input so that we can waive the substitution effects among inputs as in a multi-
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input setting. Further, we assume  where  ,  or  
represent the possible cases of decreasing, constant or increasing returns to scale, 
respectively. Second, it is assumed that the risk function 
 where  is the exogenous variable of interest, such 
as land fragmentation. The coefficients  and  capture the risk effects of explanatory 
variables in the risk function, e.g., labor  will be risk-increasing if . The 
inefficiency term  is assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution. That is, 
, where  and  are the mean and variance of the pre-truncated normal 
distribution, respectively, and  is further assumed to be a linear function of : 
. In this way, we are able to encapsulate determinants of 
production inefficiency into the so called mean inefficiency function . Given the 
truncated normal distribution of , the distribution parameters , , and  can be 
derived as follows11: 
(3-13)   
(3-14)   
(3-15)   
where , ,  and  are the density and distribution functions 
of the standard normal distribution, respectively. The inefficiency term  may be further 
11 The moments are calculated based on the recursive formula derived by Dhrymes (2005). 
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assumed to be heteroskedastic such that  may have its own explanatory variables. In 
this section we assume for simplicity that  is homoskedastic and, without loss of 
generality, normalize  to a constant through the parameters in the mean inefficiency 
function. 
Numerous studies have found risk aversion to be the plausible behavioral pattern under 
most circumstances, suggesting  Further, researchers have been interested in 
comparing risk attitudes at different levels of wealth or income and absolute risk 
aversion is often used as a viable measure. Many empirical studies find evidence of 
decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion, i.e., DARA or CARA. For the purpose of 
this study, we assume an exponential functional form for :  without 
ruling out the possibility of increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA). Given the 
relationship between  and , the downside risk aversion  is given as 
. A positive value of  corresponds to aversion to downside 
risk, implying that the decision-maker would avoid situations which may offer the 
potential for substantial gains but may also leave him even slightly vulnerable losses 
below critical level (Menezes et al. 1980).  
Given the goal of this study and the complexity of the model, we are forced to focus on 
the relationship among only a few parameters in the system, namely land fragmentation, 
the risk preferences parameter, the optimal labor use, and the optimal output, while 
assuming a constant value for other parameters. In the comparative statics section, we 
will change the values of other parameters and examine the ensuing effects on our key 
conclusions.  
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A Baseline Case 
First, we use the Simpson Index to measure land fragmentation. This measure is the 
predominant measure in the related economic literature and returns a value within the 
interval of [0,1], making it easy for the following simulation practice. Moreover, we 
focus on the more reasonable case of decreasing returns to scale by assuming 
12. The values of  and the normalized wage rate, , are jointly selected from 
many trials to make sure the expected maximal profit, , is positive; 
hence we choose  and  In the risk function 
, we assume and . It 
signifies that land fragmentation ( ) is risk decreasing while labor  is risk increasing. 
As for the coefficient in the absolute risk aversion function , we assume 
=-5 such that the calculated relative risk aversion coefficients are comparable to those 
surveyed by Cohen and Einav (2007). Finally for the distribution of inefficiency, we 
assume the pre-truncated normal distribution has a variance of one, i.e., , and the 
mean inefficiency function is specified as follows:  (i.e., ). The 
coefficient in front of  is selected to guarantee that the calculated inefficiency change 
resulting from shifts in land fragmentation will fall into a reasonable range. For example, 
if the Simpson Index goes from zero to one, the efficiency term  will go from 
12 To derive a reasonable value for this parameter, we estimated a translog production function with labor 
as the only input using the LSMS sample from Chapter 2. The coefficient estimate of labor is close to 0.7. 
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one to 0.90, meaning that land fragmentation will cause the efficiency score to drop by 
10 percentage points at most. 
Given the selected functional forms and initial values, we change the value of the 
Simpson Index from zero to one with a step of 0.01, representing an increasing level of 
land fragmentation, and calculate the optimal use of labor, , the corresponding 
maximal output, , and the expected maximal profit 
. Our goal is to see whether a more fragmented case will 
lead to a more intense use of labor and potentially a higher output and profit.  
Figure 3-1 shows clearly that as land becomes more fragmented, that is, the Simpson 
Index increases from zero to one, the optimal use of labor first increases up to a certain 
point and then starts to decrease. To understand this relationship, let’s start from an 
optimal state where a risk-averse farmer has reached a “desired tradeoff” between his 
expected payoff and risk, a tradeoff characterized by his risk preferences. Now propose a 
slightly higher level of land fragmentation. The immediate effects include a reduced risk 
and a reduced output given the parameter values we specified before, and this change 
tips the previous balance between expected payoff and risk and will deviate from the 
previous optimal state. How this farmer would adjust his labor use to reach a new 
optimal state will depend on labor’s marginal effects on expected payoff and risk. More 
specifically, if additional labor inputs will produce sufficient output/payoff to 
compensate the increased risk incurred at the same time, this farmer will increase his 
optimal labor input. Otherwise, he will decrease the optimal labor input. Given that the 
marginal effect of labor on expected output/profit is negatively related with land 
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fragmentation, we should expect that it is more likely for this farmer to use more labor to 
reach a new optimal state at a lower level of land fragmentation while using less labor at 
a higher level of land fragmentation, a speculation that is consistent with the pattern in 
Figure 3-1. 
Since the entire model comprises nonlinear relationships and the solution depends on the 
values of multiple parameters, the optimal use of labor is not necessarily a linear or 
monotonic function of the Simpson Index on the interval of [0,1]. As a matter of fact, we 
should expect a different shape of the relationship if we change the values of the 
parameters in the model. Figure 3-2 represents the case where we change the risk effect 
of labor, , from 5 to 0, i.e., labor does not have any impact on production risk.  
Regarding the relationship between land fragmentation and optimal output and profit, 
we use the parameter setting underlying Figure 3-1 to exemplify one possible case. In 
Figure 3-3, we calculate both the expected optimal output, , based on the formula 
, and the expected optimal profit, , based on the formula 
, where  is the optimal labor use calculated from the 
first step13. It clearly shows that land fragmentation may be positively correlated with 
either output or profit in a certain range (in this case, SI <= 0.67). This finding may well 
explain the observation made by Niroula and Thapa (2007), who reports that in Nepal 
13 We can also calculate the expected optimal output and profit at the efficiency frontier (i.e., ). It 
turns out that the graphical patterns are very similar to the two patterns shown in Figure 3-3. Therefore, we 
omit these two curves from Figure 3-3 to keep the presentation concise. 
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plots with smaller size resulting from land fragmentation see more labor inputs and a 
higher yield. 
Risk Preferences 
One motivation of this study is to look into how risk preferences may affect the 
adjustments in the optimal use of inputs and the corresponding optimal expected output 
and profit as a result of a shift in land fragmentation. In the previous section, we 
assumed the risk preference coefficient  in the absolute risk aversion function 
, representing the most-reported case of decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA). Firstly, we assume that DARA still holds but allow the coefficient  to vary 
from -0.1 to -6 with an increment of -0.1, thereby representing different degrees of 
DARA. The surface graph in Figure 3-4 shows that at different levels of DARA, the 
optimal labor use will roughly increase as the Simpson Index goes up to a certain point 
and then start to decrease, an intuitive pattern as we explained in the baseline case. 
Finally we focus on the cases with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and 
increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) by assume  and , respectively. 
Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 show a similar pattern –an increasing and then decreasing 
trend -- of optimal labor use as that in the DARA case. The trend illustrates the 
underlying tradeoff decision to be made by farmers between the marginal effects of 
labor on expected output/profit and its marginal effects on risk, a decision which is 
intrinsically determined by, among others factors such as the level of land 
fragmentation, their attitude towards risk, i.e., risk preferences.  
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A More General Case 
Up to this point we may be ready to conclude that risk preferences are essential to 
efficiency analysis because the exogenous determinants of efficiency (land 
fragmentation in the current example) and/or certain input (labor in the current example) 
have effects on risk. However, if we assume away all these risk effects, that is, 
 and the risk function  is now a constant, our model still returns a 
non-constant optimal labor use when the Simpson Index varies between zero and one 
(Figure 3-7). The explanation is that, even without risk effects, a shift in land 
fragmentation still changes the previous tradeoff between expected payoff and risk 
through its efficiency effects. To reach a new optimal state, farmers now can only adjust 
the expected payoff through the use of labor since labor is now assumed to have no 
marginal effect on risk. Since the marginal contribution of additional unit of labor to the 
expected payoff is decreasing as the Simpson Index goes up, farmers now tend to use 
less labor to reach the new optimal state, as demonstrated by the negatively-sloped curve 
in Figure 3-7.  
3.4 Implications for Model Estimation 
From the numerical example above, we see clearly how the relationship between land 
fragmentation, an exogenous factor that affects both production efficiency and 
production risk, and the optimal use of inputs (e.g., labor) as well as the optimal output 
and profit is determined by farmers’ risk preferences. However, the current analytical 
framework of land fragmentation’s efficiency effects, the stochastic frontier model, fails 
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to account for risk preferences. Given that most empirical studies use observational data 
such as those from household surveys to estimate efficiency effects and the near 
consensus of farmers’ risk aversion, we are curious of the probable bias arising from 
applying the stochastic frontier model to the analysis.  
To show the bias, we retain the functional forms and parameter values in the numerical 
example above to represent the underlying data generating process14. Meanwhile, we 
estimate a stochastic profit frontier model with a mean inefficiency function and 
heteroskedasticity in the variance term, using outputs from the numerical model that are 
usually observable in practice, namely, land fragmentation measured by the Simpson 
Index, labor input, and profit. The goal of this exercise is to compare the estimated 
efficiency effect coefficient of the Simpson Index in the stochastic frontier model with 
the one in the “real” data generating process. We change the values of some of the key 
parameters in the numerical example, e.g., the risk preference coefficient  and the risk 
effect coefficient , and repeat the comparison many times. It turns out that in general 
the estimated inefficiency effect of land fragmentation is not close to the true effect: 
. In some cases, the estimated efficiency effect could be negative even though 
the true effect is positive. For example, if we change the risk effect of labor,  from 
five to zero while keeping all the other initial values in the numeric example unchanged, 
the estimated inefficiency effect of land fragmentation will be -2.85 with a 95% 
14 Now we change the increment in the Simpson Index from 0.1 to 0.002 to generate enough observations 
(N=500) for the estimation of the stochastic frontier model. 
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confidence interval of (-3.66, -2.05). This exercise highlights the importance of 
including risk preferences in the analysis of efficiency effects. 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this study, we started from the curious empirical estimates of land fragmentation’s 
efficiency effects and questioned the applicability of the current framework often 
applied to this topic. We argued that even though land fragmentation is obviously 
disadvantageous to technical efficiency, it may still encourage farmers to use labor more 
intensively and probably results in a higher payoff. Based on Kumbhakar (2002)’s 
model, we extended it to one that can analyze efficiency effects of exogenous factors 
such as land fragmentation. Using a numerical example, we showed that our hypothesis 
about labor intensity may hold true under certain circumstances. More importantly, we 
found that excluding risk preferences from the estimation will lead to biased or even 
counter-intuitive estimates of efficiency effects regardless of whether the related 
exogenous variable has a risk effect. These findings should not only help clarify the 
confusion surrounding land fragmentation’s impacts on agricultural production but also 
have implications for the general literature of production efficiency estimation. 
For future research, it will be meaningful to apply the framework in this study to 
empirical estimations using observational data. There have been a few applications of 
Kumbhakar (2002)’s model, such as Di Falco and Chavas (2006) and Serra et al. (2008). 
However, they are either simply estimating a random inefficiency term instead of a 
mean inefficiency function with a group of exogenous variables or based on some 
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oversimplified assumptions about risk preferences15. The empirical estimation is 
anticipated to be challenging given the complexity of the model. Nevertheless, further 
research on this topic shall add to our understanding of economic agents’ behaviors 
under risk and their economic performance. 
15 For example, Serra et al (2008) use a second order Taylor series expansion of the utility function instead 
of the marginal utility function to derive the risk preference-related coefficients, i.e.,  and , to simplify 
the expressions. By doing that, however, they implicitly assume away the downside risk aversion and will 
have inaccurate approximation of the optimal input uses which are based upon the marginal utility 
function through the first-order conditions instead of the utility function. 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 3-1 Optimal Labor Use with DARA 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 3-2 Optimal Labor Use when Labor is Risk Neutral and DARA 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 3-3 Optimal Output and Profit with DARA 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 3-4 Optimal Labor Use with Various Degrees of DARA 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 3-5 Optimal Labor Use with CARA (γ=0) 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 3-6 Optimal Labor Use with CARA (γ=1) 
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Source: Developed by author. 
Figure 3-7 Optimal Labor Use with DARA but without Risk Effects 
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Chapter 4. Re-Examining the Reported Rates of Return to Food and 
Agricultural Research and Development16 
4.1 Introduction 
More than half a century has passed since Zvi Griliches published the first formal 
economic estimate of the rate of return to food and agricultural R&D in 195817.  Since 
then many economists have published a large number of similar estimates.  Alston et al. 
(2000) reported on 292 such studies with 1,886 evaluations of the payoffs to investments 
in agricultural R&D either in the form of internal rates of return or benefit-cost ratios18.  
Averaging across all studies, the internal rate of return was 81 percent per year, 
indicative of a widespread and persistent underinvestment19.  But rather than ramping up 
spending to more economically justifiable amounts, growth in agricultural R&D 
spending has slowed over the past several decades in many countries, particularly rich 
countries who collectively accounted for 48 percent of the world’s public expenditures 
in 2009 (Pardey, Alston and Chan-Kang 2013).  
16 This chapter is coauthored with Terrance M. Hurley and Philip G. Pardey. A revised submission of this 
draft has been published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(5): 1492-1504, 2014. 
17 Heckman (2006) wrote that “[Griliches 1958] early empirical work on the social rate of return to 
research activity, and on the role of economic incentives in determining the distribution of benefits from 
new technologies [Griliches 1957], laid the foundations for scientific study of these topics.”  Schultz 
(1953) gives the earliest known economic estimate of the overall benefits attributable to public agricultural 
research in the United States, but did not report a formal benefit-cost ratio or internal rate of return. 
18 See also the summaries of this evidence by Evenson (2001) and Fuglie and Heisey (2007). 
19 Ruttan (1980 and 1982) presents arguments regarding the underinvestment hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
 
 
79 
One plausible explanation for this investment behavior is that economists got it wrong—
systematically overstating the rates of return to R&D.  Alternatively, but with equal 
effect, those making R&D investment decisions may have simply dismissed the reported 
rates of return as unbelievably high.  There is certainly precedent for that perspective.  
McMillen’s 1929 account of then U.S. Secretary of Agriculture “Tama Jim” Wilson’s 
attempt to compile a report on what, if any, profit could be shown from the Department 
of Agriculture’s research spending reads: 
Numerous interests and industries were asked to estimate conservatively the value of 
such of the department’s findings as affected their operations.  Finally the expenditures 
were totaled in one column, the estimates of the returns in another, and the sheets placed 
before the venerable secretary. 
“This will never do!” he protested. “No one will swallow these figures!”  The report 
revealed that for every single dollar that had been spent for scientific research in the 
Department of Agriculture, the nation was reaping an annual increase of nearly a 
thousand dollars in new wealth. 
“Cut it down to $500,” insisted Wilson. “That’s as much as we can expect the public, 
or Congress, to believe.” 
(McMillen 1929, p. 141) 
In this paper we address the question, is the reported rate of return evidence credible, 
and if not what can or should be done to recalibrate that evidence?  To do so we develop 
and deploy a comprehensive compilation of rate-of-return estimates published since 
1958.  We argue that the weight of evidence supports the conclusion that the vast 
majority of rate of return estimates are implausibly high.  To understand why, we 
analytically explore key methodological conventions that have pervaded the literature 
despite criticisms dating back to Griliches’ seminal contribution.  Where data permit, we 
recalibrate the prior estimates in light of these criticisms.  While our analysis serves to 
downsize the overall average of the returns to food and agricultural R&D, the 
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recalibrated estimates are still substantial enough to question the current scaling back of 
public agricultural R&D spending in many countries. 
4.2 Evidence at Face Value 
Among the 2,242 published evaluations we compiled from 372 separate studies 
published between 1958 and 2011, the internal rate of return (IRR)—the discount rate 
that equates the present value of an investment’s stream of benefits with the present 
value of its stream of costs—was predominant, reported for 91.4 percent of the 
published evaluations20.  Alternatively, 28.2 percent of the evaluations reported benefit-
cost ratios (BCR)—the present value of an investment’s stream of benefits divided by 
the present value of its stream of costs.  Both IRRs and BCRs were reported for 19.6 
percent of the evaluations.   
The database we compiled includes studies of the impact of agricultural R&D for 79 
countries.  Nearly half of the evaluation studies (and 42 percent of the estimates) were 
published in the 1990s with 38 percent of these studies appearing in peer reviewed 
journals.  The rest come from books, graduate dissertations, conference papers, and the 
grey literature, including reports published by various international and national 
agencies.  Nine out of ten evaluations constitute ex post appraisals of past R&D 
investments; the remainder assessed the prospective returns to R&D investments yet to 
20 See the supplementary online appendix for details regarding how we compiled our database of rate-of-
return estimates to agricultural R&D.  The supplementary online appendix also includes an overview of 
the number of studies and evaluations, and descriptive statistics for the reported IRR estimates based on 
the type (e.g., basic, applied, or extension), commodity orientation, and geographic location of the 
research and research performer. 
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be made.  Most of the studies (88 percent) focused on investments with both cost and 
benefit streams that spanned multiple years. 
Figure 4-1, panel a shows the kernel density estimate for the reported IRRs in addition to 
other descriptive statistics.  The average IRR across all 2,049 observations is 67.6 
percent per year, ranging from a low of -100 to a high of 5,645 percent per year.  The 
distribution is skewed with a median of 42.6 percent per year, well less than the 
average21.  Three quarters of the IRRs exceed 24.6 percent per year.  To gain some 
perspective on the implications of such high rates of return, we evaluated just how much 
the $4.1 billion (2005 prices) invested in 2000 in agricultural R&D by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and state agricultural experiment stations (SAES) 
(Alston et al. 2010) would be worth in 2050 assuming benefits accrued over 50 years, 
which is not atypical for these types of investment (Alston et al. 2000).  At the average 
rate of return reported in the literature, this investment would yield $670 quintillion 
(×1018) in net benefits.  At the median rate of return, a more robust measure of central 
tendency given some extreme IRR estimates, it would still be worth $208 quadrillion 
(×1015).  Even the first quartile estimate would be worth $244 trillion.  Comparing these 
results with U.S. and global gross domestic product (GDP) makes it hard not to question 
their plausibility.  The U.S. GDP in 2000 was about $11 trillion (2005 U.S. dollars), 
while the world GDP was $40 trillion (World Bank 2012).  By 2050, the forecasted GDP 
21 Notably, the reported returns to the 737 IRR estimates culled from peer reviewed studies (mean of 74.7 
percent per year, median of 43.7 percent per year) are larger on average than the 1,312 estimates taken 
from studies published in non-peer reviewed journals (mean of 63.6 percent per year, median 42 percent 
per year). 
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for the United States and world are $28 and $148 trillion (2005 U.S. dollars) 
respectively (Foure, Benassy-Quere and Fontagne 2010).  Therefore, the median IRR 
estimate suggests the benefits attributable to just public agricultural R&D investments 
by the United States in 2000 would be more than 1,400 times the projected world GDP 
in 2050! 
Figure 4-1, panel b shows the kernel density for the reported BCRs in addition to other 
descriptive statistics.  The mean BCR was 22.9 implying a more plausible return of 
$93.9 billion on a $4.1 billion investment.  The median BCR of 10.5 implies a return of 
$43.0 billion, while the first quartile estimate of 3.2 implies a return of $13.1 billion.  
Compared with the returns implied by the IRR estimates, the BCRs’ implications are 
much more plausible, yet just over one out of four studies in our agricultural R&D 
returns database reported BCRs. 
4.3 Modified Internal Rate of Return 
The IRR for an investment is implicitly defined by  
(4-1)   
where T > 0 is the term of the investment, and bt ≥ 0 and ct ≥ 0 for t = 0,…, T are the 
investment’s stream of benefits and costs such that in aggregate there are some benefits 
and some costs:  and .  While the IRR has served as the 
predominant measure of investment performance in the agricultural R&D evaluation 
literature, it has been viewed critically by economists for more than half a century.  
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Lorie and Savage (1955) and Solomon (1956) noted it need not be unique22.  Hirshleifer 
(1958) and Baldwin (1959) argued that with more than two periods the IRR assumes 
intermediate cash flows can be reinvested (or borrowed) at the same rate of return as the 
initial investment, which is generally not correct or reasonable.  Griliches shared these 
concerns, but still reported IRR bounds, implicating Martin J. Bailey for suggesting such 
a calculation (Griliches 1958, p. 425, footnote 16). 
Criticisms of the IRR have included suggestions for improvement such as the modified 
internal rate of return (MIRR).  The MIRR is defined as 
(4-2)   
where  is the future value of benefits assuming a 
reinvestment discount rate δr and  is the present value of 
costs assuming a borrowing discount rate of δc.  A more intuitive interpretation is 
apparent from the formulation PVC(δc)(1 + MIRR)T = FVB(δr), which shows that the 
MIRR is the annual compounding interest rate for a deposit PVC(δc) at time 0 that pays 
back FVB(δr) at time T.  While Lin (1976) appears to be the first to have coined the term 
“Modified Internal Rate of Return,” Biondi (2006) traces its origins back to Duvillard 
(1787).  Alston et al. (2011) appears to be the first to apply the MIRR to agricultural 
R&D (see also Andersen and Song 2013).  For investments from 1949 to 2002 
22 Norstrøm (1972) shows a sufficient condition for a unique IRR is that the sign of the sequence of 
cumulative sums of the net value of benefits and costs over time can change only once. 
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undertaken by the USDA and each of the contiguous 48 SAESs, they found an average 
IRR of 22.7 percent per year with a range of 15.3 to 23.1 percent.  Assuming 
reinvestment and borrowing discount rates of 0.03, the average MIRR was a more 
modest 9.9 percent per year, with a range of 7.7 to 11.7 percent.  These results raise an 
interesting and pertinent policy question.  How attractive would prior estimates of the 
returns to agricultural R&D be if they were based on the MIRR instead of the IRR?  To 
answer this question, we first analytically explore how the IRR and MIRR differ. 
IRR versus MIRR: Analytics and Intuition 
The differences between the IRR and MIRR are more transparent when Equation (4-1) is 
written as , which shows the IRR assumes the simultaneous 
equality of the reinvestment and borrowing discount rates, and the MIRR: δr = δc = 
MIRR.  Figure 4-2 shows the implications of these assumptions using a contour map of 
the reinvestment and borrowing discount rates that yield the same MIRR.  Qualitatively, 
individual contours slope downward with contours for higher δrs and higher δcs 
representing higher MIRRs23.  By assuming δr = δc, the definition of the IRR confines 
attention to points along the 45o line.  By further assuming MIRR = δr = δc, the definition 
only picks points where the value corresponding to the MIRR contour equals the value 
on the 45o line where the two intersect.  In figure 4-2, this occurs at point a where MIRR 
= δr = δc = 0.31.  This example was designed with a unique IRR, though this need not be 
23 See corollary S1 in the supplementary online appendix. 
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the case.  The MIRR is unambiguously greater (less) than the IRR when both δr and δc 
are greater (less) than the IRR24.  The MIRR requires specifying values for δr and δc.  
The chosen values yield a unique MIRR: δr = 0.05 and δc = 0.15 correspond to the 
contour with MIRR = 0.2 in Figure 4-2. 
Recall that the average of reported IRRs in our database is 67.6 percent per year with 
three-quarters of these estimates exceeding 24.6 percent.  Alternatively, for the 599 BCR 
estimates in our database that reported the common discount rate (δ = δr = δc) used in the 
calculation, the average, minimum and maximum discount rates are 7.2, 2.0 and 15.0 
percent per year respectively.  This suggests the discount rates deemed reasonable by 
agricultural R&D evaluation researchers have tended to be lower than the reported IRRs.  
Combining Figure 4-2 insights with our analytic findings leads us to hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: The rates of return to agricultural R&D reported in the literature would 
have typically been lower if the MIRR was used instead of the IRR. 
The high IRRs and BCRs found in the literature suggest quite profitable investments.  
With Figure 4-2 showing the IRR and MIRR are likely to differ except by coincidence, 
the question of whether this difference is smaller or larger for more profitable 
investments is of interest.  The profitability of an investment can be measured by its net 
present value—the present value of benefits minus the present value of costs.  A 
parsimonious parameterization of profitability can be constructed by defining the present 
24 Based on equation S11 in the supplementary online appendix. 
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value of benefits as  and present value of costs as 
 where  and  for t = 0,…, T are the distributions 
of benefits and costs over time such that .  Profitability is then 
increasing in the undiscounted benefit-cost ratio BCR0 = B/C for profitable 
investments—i.e., have a positive net present value25.  This reformulation also allows 
Equation (4-2) to be written as 
(4-3)   
where  for proper discount rates — i.e., where δr > -1 
and δc > -1. 
Equation (4-3) implies the MIRR is increasing in the BCR0 26:  
(4-4)   
which intuitively suggests more profitable investments, in terms of a higher 
undiscounted benefit-cost ratio, have higher rates of return, in terms of the MIRR.  
Substituting the IRR for δr, δc and the MIRR, Equation (4-3) also implies 
(4-5)   
25 See proposition S1 in the supplementary online appendix. 
26 See proposition S1 in the supplementary online appendix. 
 
                                                 
 
 
87 
assuming the IRR is unique27.  Unlike Equation (4-4), Equation (4-5) is not 
unambiguously positive.  It is positive (negative) as 
28.  The implication is that more profitable 
investments, in terms of a higher undiscounted benefit-cost ratio, need not have higher 
rates of return, as measured by the IRR. 
Comparing equations (4-4) and (4-5), the results would essentially be identical if the 
first quotient on the right-hand side of Equation (4-5) equaled one, which cannot be the 
case for proper IRRs, that is IRR > -1.  The reason for this confounding term is illustrated 
in Figure 4-3 for unique and positive IRRs (98.5 percent of the evaluations in our 
database).  Each panel shows the relationship between the MIRR and δ = δr = δc for two 
investments that differ only in terms of the BCR0.  All examples were constructed with 
unique IRRs.  The assumption δr = δc serves only to facilitate graphical exposition.  Four 
qualitative characteristics in Figure 4-3 hold generally: 1) the MIRR is increasing in the 
BCR0 (i.e., the MIRR curve with the higher BCR0 is above the one with the lower 
BCR0), 2) the MIRR is increasing in δ (i.e., MIRR curves are positively sloped), 3) the 
difference in the MIRRs for alternative BCR0s is increasing in δ (i.e., MIRR curves 
diverge as δ increases), and 4) for unique and positive IRRs, the IRR is increasing 
(decreasing) in the BCR0 when BCR0 >(<) 129. 
27 Equation (4-5) follows from the substitution of equation (S18) into equation (S16) in the supplementary 
online appendix. 
28 See proposition S3 in the supplementary online appendix. 
29 See propositions S2 and S4, and corollaries S2 and S4 in the supplementary online appendix. 
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In panel a, BCR0 is greater than one for both investments, so the MIRR curves must 
intersect the 45o line (where the MIRR and δ are equal) from above.  When δ = 0.1 and 
BCR0 = 3, the MIRR is 0.2.  The IRR is 0.31 where the MIRR crosses the 45o line at 
point a1.  Increasing the BCR0 to 9, the MIRR increases to 0.38, while the IRR increases 
to 0.69 where the MIRR curve now crosses the 45o line at point c1.  Increasing the BCR0 
from 3 to 9 changes the MIRR from point a0 to b0 reflecting a shift in the MIRR curve 
holding δ constant at 0.1.  The change in the IRR reflects a more complicated shift in the 
MIRR curve, from point a1 to b1 holding δ = IRR constant at 0.31, as well as a movement 
along the curve from point b1 to c1 in order to bring the MIRR back into equality with δ.  
Note that the divergence of MIRR curves implies the difference in the MIRR between 
points b1 and a1 is larger than the difference between points b0 and a0 because δ is less 
than the IRR for BCR0 = 3.  If δ was greater than the IRR for BCR0 = 3, then the 
difference between points b0 and a0 would be larger.  The difference in the MIRR 
between points c1 and b1 is positive because increasing the BCR0 shifts the MIRR curve 
up and the MIRR curve is positively sloped.  For this example, the net effect is that the 
difference between the IRR and MIRR is increasing in the BCR0.  More generally, for a 
unique and positive IRR, the difference in the IRR and MIRR is increasing in 
profitability, in terms of the undiscounted benefit-cost ratio, if δr and δc are less than the 
IRR, the undiscounted benefit-cost ratio is greater than one, and the investment is 
profitable30.   
30 Follows from propositions S1, S4 and S5(a) in the supplementary online appendix. 
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In panel b, BCR0 is less than one for both investments, so the MIRR curves must 
intersect the 45o line from below.  When δ = 0.1 and BCR0 = 0.4, the MIRR is 0.03, 
while the IRR is 0.26.  Increasing the BCR0 to 0.6, the MIRR increases to 0.08, while the 
IRR decreases to 0.14.  Increasing BCR0 from 0.4 to 0.6 changes the MIRR from point a0 
to b0 again reflecting a shift in the MIRR curve holding δ constant at 0.1, while the 
change in the IRR reflects a shift in the MIRR curve from point a1 to b1 holding δ = IRR 
constant at 0.26 and movement along the curve from point b1 to c1 in order to bring the 
MIRR back into equality with δ.  Note that once again the divergence of the MIRR 
curves implies the difference in the MIRR between point b1 and a1 is larger than the 
difference between point b0 and a0.  The difference in the MIRR between point c1 and b1 
is negative because increasing the BCR0 shifts the MIRR curve up and the MIRR curve is 
positively sloped.  For this example, the net effect is that the difference between the IRR 
and MIRR is decreasing in the BCR0.  More generally, for a unique and positive IRR, the 
difference between the IRR and MIRR is decreasing in profitability, in terms of the 
undiscounted benefit-cost ratio, if the undiscounted benefit-cost ratio is less than one and 
the investment is profitable31.  
Whether panel a or b in Figure 4-3 is more typical of the 98.5 percent of evaluations in 
our database with positive IRRs depends on whether BCR0 is typically greater or less 
than one for these evaluations.  If the large IRRs found in the literature are indeed 
indicative of profitable investments, it seems most likely that aggregate benefits 
31 Follows from propositions S1, S4 and S5(b) in the supplementary online appendix. 
 
                                                 
 
 
90 
typically exceed aggregate costs such that BCR0 > 1, which Figure 4-3 and our analytic 
results then lead us to hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The difference between the reported rates of return to agricultural R&D 
based on the IRR and the rates of return estimated using the MIRR is typically larger for 
more profitable investments. 
To further explore Hypotheses 1 and 2 empirically, we compare previously published 
rates of return based on the IRR with recalibrated rates of return based on the MIRR 
where feasible. 
4.4 Reconstructing Rates of Return Using the MIRR 
Athanasopoulos (1978) and Negrete (1978) identify the relationship 
(4-6)   
This relationship is convenient for recalibrating previous IRRs using the MIRR for 
evaluations that reported a BCR, discount rate, and investment term as well as an IRR.  
However, such a recalibration still neglects concerns that the appropriate reinvestment 
discount rate need not equal the borrowing discount rate, which is especially true for 
publicly funded agricultural research investments where many benefits accrue privately 
(to producers, consumers, or both) from R&D financed from general government 
revenues.   
The relationship in Equation (4-6) can be generalized for differing discount rates: 
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(4-7) 32  
Note that Equation (4-7) reduces to (4-6) when δ = δr = δc.  More importantly, Equation 
(4-7) indicates that the MIRR implicit in previous studies can be calculated given the 
term of the investment, the BCR and its associated discount rate, the distribution of costs 
and benefits, and the reinvestment and borrowing discount rates. Unfortunately, while T, 
BCR, and δ are reported in many previous studies, seldom are the detailed distributions 
of costs and benefits.  Therefore, calculation of the MIRR for previous studies requires 
some method for reconstructing the distributions of costs and benefits given commonly 
reported information. 
There is a relationship between the IRR and BCR that can be exploited in an effort to 
reconstruct the distributions of costs and benefits over time:  
(4-8) 33  
Equation (4-8) provides a direct relationship between the BCR and IRR that also depends 
on δ and the distributions of benefits and costs.  This relationship is useful because it 
indicates which distributions of cost and benefits (i.e., profiles of s and s for t 
=0,…, T) are consistent with the T, BCR, IRR, and δ reported in a study.  Therefore, if 
we can identify distributions that reasonably satisfy Equation (4-8), we can use these 
32 Our derivation of Equation (4-7) is reported in the supplementary online appendix. See equation (S29). 
33 Our derivation of Equation (4-8) is reported in the supplementary online appendix. See equation (S28). 
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distributions with Equation (4-7) to calculate the MIRR for any desired reinvestment and 
borrowing discount rates. 
We reconstructed the distributions of costs and benefits assuming each can be 
reasonably approximated with a beta distribution34.  The beta distribution is appealing 
for modeling phenomena that undergo growth and decline, which is characteristic of the 
different stages of technological diffusion in agricultural production and the profile of 
benefits attributed to the uptake of these research-induced technologies.  The distribution 
is flexible enough to capture investment streams characterized by rapid growth followed 
by a slow decline, slow growth followed by rapid decline, and more balanced growth 
and decline.  In addition to being quite flexible, the unit beta with only two-parameters 
each for the characterization of costs and benefits provides a parsimonious parameter 
space that can be searched to find the distributions that come closest to satisfying 
Equation (4-8) (e.g., that minimizes the squared difference between the right- and left-
hand sides of the equation). 
The distributions of costs and benefits were approximated separately for each of the 270 
evaluations that reported both the IRR and BCR as well as other necessary information.  
The best fitting beta parameters were found by minimizing the squared difference in the 
34 See Reconstruction of the Rates of Return Using the MIRR section of the supplementary online 
appendix. 
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observed and approximate BCRs using Matlab and its fminunc function.  All observed 
BCRs were within 0.01 percent of the approximated BCR35. 
4.5 The Returns to Research Recalibrated 
There were 446 R&D evaluations from 75 studies that reported a BCR along with the 
other necessary information for recalibration based on Equation (4-6).  Assuming the 
reinvestment and borrowing discount rates equal the discount rate used to compute these 
BCRs, Equation (4-6) yields an average MIRR of 17.9 percent per year, with a minimum 
and maximum of -100 and 321.5 percent per year respectively.  The median MIRR is 
14.2 percent per year, with an interquartile range of 14.3 percent per year (9.0 to 23.3 
percent per year).   
Sensitivity Analysis 
Relaxing the assumption of equal discount rates for the 270 BCR evaluations that also 
reported an IRR and using the unit beta distribution to approximate the costs and benefits 
distributions, Equation (4-7) can be used to explore the sensitivity of the MIRRs implied 
by these evaluations to alternative reinvestment and borrowing discount rates.  Figure 4-
4, panel a shows the results as the reinvestment and borrowing rates vary from 0 to 10 
35 We were conscious that a beta distribution may not yield a global solution and that functional form may 
influence the MIRRs we derived with this method.  Thus we also considered a trapezoidal distribution 
(which makes it possible to identify global solutions, though admittedly imprecisely due to the numerical 
inefficiency of the algorithm) to test the influence of functional form.  Comparisons of the results using 
the two alternative distributions are provided in the supplementary online appendix.  The beta distribution 
provided a better fit for all of the observations, though both distributions still provided similar MIRR 
estimates. 
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percent per year.  The median MIRR is at a minimum of 9.8 percent per year when the 
reinvestment and borrowing discount rates are both 0 percent per year.  It is at a 
maximum of 16.6 percent per year when both discount rates are 10 percent per year.  
Figure 4-4, panel b shows that the interquartile range varies relatively little between 
about 9.5 and 12.8 percent per year as the reinvestment and borrowing discount rates 
vary from 0 to 10 percent per year. 
We further explore the implications of recalibrating the IRR using the MIRR assuming a 
borrowing discount rate δc = 0.03 reflecting the average real rate of return for long-term 
U.S. treasuries, and a reinvestment discount rate δr = 0.035 falling between the average 
rate of return to long-term U.S. treasuries and Standard & Poor’s 500 equity index from 
1969 to 201036.  Two additional issues we address that have been largely neglected in 
the literature, but are particularly relevant for publicly funded R&D that generates 
privately accruing benefits, are the deadweight loss of taxation (e.g., Harberger 1964; 
Fox 1985) and the proportion of benefits that are consumed versus saved.  With a 
marginal excess burden (MEB) from taxation equal to δMEB ≥ 0 and a savings rate equal 
to 1 ≥ δs ≥ 0, the MIRR can be rewritten as  
(4-7’)   
36 Data for the nominal rates of return of long-term U.S treasuries were obtained from James and Sylla 
(2006) and BGFRS (2012).  These data were inflation adjusted using the consumer price index obtained 
from BLS (2012). 
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for real benefits and costs.  Jones (2010) reviews estimates of the MEB from around the 
world finding values ranging from 0.0 to 0.56 due to variation in methodologies, the 
types of taxes evaluated, and the tax rates.  For our purpose, we initially consider δMEB = 
0.25.  To approximate the proportion of benefits that are consumed and saved, we use 
the U.S. private savings rate taken as a proportion of personal income from 1969 to 2010 
(BEA 2012): δs = 0.045. 
Figure 4-5 provides a detailed look at the reported IRRs and MIRRs estimated with 
Equation (4-7’) for the subsample of 270 evaluations ranked by our estimates of BCR0 37.  
Table 4-1 compares the IRRs to the MIRRs estimated using both equations (4-6) and (4-
7’) for this same subsample.  As Figures 4-2 and 4-3 and our analytic results suggest, the 
IRR typically exceeds the MIRR.  Indeed, the IRR exceeds the MIRR estimates for all 
270 observations in this subsample.  On average, the IRR is 3.8 times larger than the 
MIRR when Equation (4-6) is used and 5.0 times larger when Equation (4-7’) is used, 
which is even more dramatic than the 2.3 proportional difference found by Alston et al. 
(2011).   
Comparing the subsample of 270 IRRs to the remaining 1,779 IRRs in the full sample 
using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we can reject the equality of the 
distributions (D = 0.11, p-value < 0.01).  To get some sense of how our results might 
change if we had more information on the full sample, we regressed (using a simple 
linear equation with an intercept) the MIRR on the IRR for our subsample and then used 
37 Analogous results were obtained using Equation (4-6). 
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these results to project MIRRs for the rest of the full sample.  For MIRRs based on 
Equation (4-6) with a regression R2 of 0.25, the average MIRR was nearly identical, 
while the median was somewhat larger for the full sample (16.6 versus 14.3 percent per 
year).  For MIRRs based on Equation (4-7’) with a regression R2 of 0.29, the average 
MIRR was again nearly identical, with a somewhat larger median for the full sample 
(12.5 versus 9.8 percent per year). 
Comparing the MIRRs calculated with Equation (4-6), which did not rely on an 
approximation of the distributions of costs and benefits, to those calculated with 
Equation (4-7’) for the subsample of 270 evaluations reveals that the means, medians, 
and 1st and 3rd quartiles are all lower when using Equation (4-7’).  This result is 
attributable to the fact that the average discount rate used to evaluate the BCR was 6.3 
percent per year, which is higher than both the reinvestment and borrowing discount 
rates used in the calculations with Equation (4-7’).  It is also attributable to our 
adjustment of costs to account for the marginal excess burden of taxation, and our 
adjustments of benefits to account for the proportion of benefits that are saved versus 
consumed.  As the MEB in Equation (4-7’) is varied from 0 to 0.56 the median MIRR 
varies from 10.4 to 9.1 percent per year.  Alternatively, varying the proportion of 
benefits reinvested in Equation (4-7’) from 0 to 0.5 results in variation in the median 
MIRR from 9.7 to 10.4 percent per year.  Together these results show the robustness of 
the MIRR to alternative assumptions regarding the approximation methodology, the 
reinvestment and borrowing discount rates, the MEB of taxation, and the proportion of 
reinvested benefits. 
 
97 
4.6 Conclusion 
The plethora of estimates of returns to agricultural R&D investments that have emerged 
since Griliches’ seminal evaluation of hybrid corn suggests these investments have paid 
off handsomely, and continue to do so.  Yet, contrary to what one might expect from this 
evidence, growth in agricultural R&D spending over the past several decades has 
ratcheted down in many countries—economists have failed to make their case to policy 
makers for the value of these investments.  However, when considering the implications 
of the rates of return to agricultural R&D reported by economists over the past half a 
century and more, it is easy to understand why policy makers might be skeptical and 
choose to reject them. 
The predominant measure of the rate of return to agricultural R&D investments used by 
economists during this time has been the internal rate of return (IRR).  The IRR has 
prevailed even though it has been widely criticized, including by Griliches, for as long 
as it has been the preferred summary measure of investment performance in the 
agricultural R&D evaluation literature.  We explore how the body of agricultural R&D 
rate of return evidence might have taken shape if economists had heeded Griliches’ (and 
others’) warnings and used some other summary measure for the returns to R&D.  In 
particular, we explore the conceptually more appealing modified internal rate of return 
(MIRR), which as equations (4-6) and (4-7) reveal is just a direct transformation of the 
benefit-cost ratio.   
Analytically, we show how the IRR must exceed the MIRR when the appropriate 
reinvestment and borrowing discount rates are below the IRR.  Furthermore, we show 
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how the difference in the IRR and MIRR tends to be larger for more profitable 
investments when aggregate benefits exceed aggregate costs—which is typically the 
case explored in the agricultural R&D evaluation literature.  These results are driven by 
the restrictive assumptions employed in the IRR calculation—the simultaneous equality 
of the reinvestment and borrowing discount rates and the MIRR.  The magnitude of the 
difference, however, is an empirical question. 
Using the MIRR to recast previous estimates of the IRR, we find much more muted 
returns to agricultural R&D: a median of 9.8 versus 39.0 percent per year (Table 4-1) or 
means of 13.6 versus 67.9 percent per year for the 270 IRR estimates we recalibrated.  
With a return of 39.0 percent per year, the U.S.’s $4.1 billion investment in agricultural 
R&D in 2000 would generate $58 quadrillion (×1015) in net benefits by 2050—more 
than 390 times the projected world GDP in 2050.  With a 9.8 percent per year rate of 
return, this investment would produce $439 billion—just 1.6 percent of the projected 
U.S. GDP in 2050.  Overall, we find that the MIRR not only provides more muted, but 
also more plausible estimates for the rate of return to agricultural R&D for a wide range 
of assumptions regarding important aspects of the calculation.   
Our recalibrated estimates of the rates of return to public agricultural R&D are more 
modest but still substantial enough to question the current scaling back of public 
agricultural R&D spending in many countries.  If this slowdown in the rate of growth of 
public spending continues, the growth in supply of important agricultural staples will fail 
to keep pace with the growth in demand, putting upward pressure on food prices and 
further stressing the world’s most vulnerable populations. 
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It is fair to question whether our estimates of rates of return based on the MIRR are still 
too high.  This may indeed be the case, which is why additional work remains to further 
refine the methodologies used to quantify research benefits and costs over time (Alston 
and Pardey 2001), and identify more appropriate discount rates whether they vary by 
benefits and costs (or over time as Hirshleifer (1958) suggests).  Still, we do not think 
this in any way diminishes the importance of discarding the IRR as a summary measure 
of the performance of agricultural R&D or any other investments—a purpose for which 
it was never intended in the first place. 
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Panel a: Internal Rates of Return 
 
 
Panel b: Benefit-Cost Ratios 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Note: Panel a represents a kernel density estimate (kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 7.0) 
fitted across 2,049 IRR estimates.  For presentation purposes, the plotted observations were 
truncated.  Panel b represents a kernel density estimate (kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 
4.9) fitted across 632 BCR estimates.  For presentation purposes, the plotted observations were 
truncated.  
 
Figure 4-1 Distribution of reported internal rates of return and benefit-cost ratio 
estimates 
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Source: Developed by authors.  See supplementary online appendix section Examples Used to 
Construct Figures 4-2 and 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-2 Example MIRR contour map given the reinvestment and borrowing discount 
rates 
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Panel a 
 
Panel b 
 
 
Source: Developed by authors. See supplementary online appendix section Examples Used to 
Construct Figures 4-2 and 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3 Example IRR and MIRR comparisons with increasing profitability 
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Panel a: Median of the modified internal rates of return 
 
 
Panel b: Interquartile range of the modified internal rates of return 
 
 
Source: Developed by authors. 
 
Figure 4-4 Sensitivity of the modified internal rates of return to alternative reinvestment 
and borrowing discount rates 
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Source: Authors’ estimates.  
 
Note: We assume the reinvestment discount, borrowing discount, and saving rates are 3.5, 3, and 
4.5 percent per year respectively, plus marginal excess burden (MEB) of taxation of 25 percent.  
For presentation purposes the plots have been truncated. The lines representing the best-fitting 
linear trends (solid for the MIRRs and dashed for the IRRs) are calculated based on the full range 
of data. 
 
Figure 4-5 Comparison of the internal rates of return (IRR) to the modified internal rates 
of return (MIRR) estimated using Equation (4-7’) 
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Table 4-1 Comparison of the Reported Internal Rates of Return (IRR) and Recalibrated 
Modified Internal Rates of Return (MIRR) 
 
 
IRR 
 MIRR 
 
 Equation (4-6) with  = =  
Equation (4-7’) with 
 = 3.5%, =3%, 
=4.5%, =25% 
     
 Percent Per Year 
Mean 67.9  17.8 13.6 
Minimum 7.4  4.7 -2.0 
1st Quartile 21.6  10.0 7.8 
Median 39.0  14.3 9.8 
3rd Quartile 81.8  22.0 16.9 
Maximum 1,736.0  127.8 107.0 
Observation with 
IRR < MIRR 
  0 0 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
Note: Comparison for the subsample of 270 evaluations that reported the IRR, benefit-cost ratio 
(BCR), discount rate used to calculate the BCR, and time when the investment’s costs and 
benefits started and ended.  
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Chapter 5. Accounting for Variation in the Returns to Agricultural R&D38 
5.1 Introduction 
Research is a risky business. While the reported economic returns to investments in food 
and agricultural R&D (research and development) are high, on average—with a mean 
internal rate of return (IRR) of 67.6 percent per year for research conducted from 1958 
to 2011 (Chapter 4)—, as one might expect there is a large dispersion in the returns to 
R&D around this average (Figure 5-1). The minimum is a dismal -100 percent per year, 
while the maximum is an incredible 5,645 percent per year. A closer look at the IRR 
estimates grouped into various categories (see Hurley, Rao and Pardey 2014, 
Supplementary Table S1) reinforces the notion that the returns to research are highly 
variable. For example, the mean reported IRRs for agricultural commodities range from 
44.6 percent per year for research on natural resources to 256.0 percent per year for 
poultry research.  
Figure 5-2 plots a moving average of the median of the reported IRRs indexed by two 
notions of time: one the publication date of the study that reported the estimated IRR, 
and the other the date of the initial investment in the R&D that gave rise to the reported 
IRR. A line of best fit through both these plots indicates little change in the moving-
average-median of the reported rate of return over time when indexed by date of initial 
38 This chapter is coauthored with Terrance M. Hurley and Philip G. Pardey. 
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investment versus a decline in the moving-average-median return when indexed by the 
publication date of the study.  
These stylized facts prompt two immediate and substantive questions. First, to what 
extent does the wide dispersion in the reported rates of return to returns reflect intrinsic 
differences in those returns versus differences in the methodologies used to estimate 
them? Second, and relatedly, does the decline in the median reported return to research 
stratified by publication date suggest a change in the methodologies used to estimate 
those returns is giving rise to this decline? To the extent the actual rate of return varies 
among areas of research or has declined over time, this would indicate that a reallocation 
of research resources is required. However, to the extent that methodological differences 
account for (at least some of) the variation in the reported rates of return to research, 
then the research investment implications of this evidence are less clear cut.  
The research described in this chapter sets out to answer these two questions, and uses 
meta-evaluation methods applied to version 3 of the InSTePP rate-of-return database 
compiled by Hurley, Rao and Pardey (2014) to do so.39 More specifically, we will 
examine the factors that account for the variation in the internal rate of return (IRR), or 
the effect size in the jargon of meta-analysis studies, thereby identifying crucial 
methodological details that induce variation in the reported returns to agricultural R&D 
39 See their online appendix for a detailed procedure used to assemble the original rates of return database. 
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evaluations as well as provide clues to meaningfully addressing the policy questions 
listed above. 
5.2 Conceptual Model 
Meta-evaluation studies commonly involving pooling estimates of a variable of interest, 
in this case a measure of the rate of return to research, and then assessing the source of 
variation among these estimates. In this section, we briefly review the factors that arise 
in meta-evaluation studies in general and assessments of the rate-of-return estimates 
arising from the agricultural research evaluation literature in particular. 
Sample Heterogeneity 
The wide variation in the reported IRRs are attributable to two basic causes, factual and 
methodological. In the agricultural R&D evaluation literature, factual causes refer to 
variables associated with different aspects of the R&D investment, such as the research 
orientation (e.g., basic versus applied research), commodity orientation (e.g., crop 
research versus livestock research), geographical orientation (e.g., developing countries 
versus developed countries), and timing of the investment (as indicated, for example, by 
the initial year of the stream of R&D investments being evaluated).  
For most of the variables falling within the “factual” category, there is no a priori 
knowledge or consensus regarding how changes in any one of these variable may affect 
the rate of return estimate. For example, many have speculated as to whether or not the 
rate of return of agricultural R&D conducted in developed countries is intrinsically 
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higher than that conducted in developing countries, the answer to which has substantive 
implications for economic development policy. Similarly, it is not readily apparent 
whether or not the returns to agricultural R&D are likely to increase or decrease over 
time (Alston et al. 2000). On the one hand it maybe that all the easier (or less costly) 
research problems were tackled first, such that, other things being constant, one might 
expect there to be diminishing returns to R&D over time. On the other hand, more recent 
research stands on the ever-broader shoulders of the research that went before it, so to 
the extent that we accumulate new scientific insights, basic knowhow, and methods of 
research that open up entirely new scientific possibilities, then the returns to research 
might be expected to increase over time. Accounting for the effects of the myriad likely 
sources of variation in the reported returns to R&D can help reveal answers to important 
policy questions such as the time path of the (actual distinct from estimated) returns to 
R&D in ways that have important policy implications. 
Setting aside the fundamental (or so-called factual) sources of variation in the reported 
returns to R&D, two other general sources of variation are differences among research 
evaluation studies in the methodological details they deployed, and differences arising 
by way of the widely dispersed nature of the publications—and by implication the 
review processes associated with these publications—from which the estimated returns 
to research were gleaned. Moreover, the nature of the agricultural R&D being evaluated, 
the institutional affiliations of authors, and their relationship with the research being 
evaluated (i.e., self-evaluation or not) are also other potential sources of variation in the 
reported returns to R&D. For example, authors of self-evaluation studies may have a 
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tendency to overstate the returns to research (relative to the returns that would be 
estimated if the evaluation was undertaken by an evaluator external to the organization 
whose research is being assessed), although, as Alston et al. (2000) described, even this 
seemingly secondary issue is complicated and plausible, a priori, arguments can be made 
for a reversal in these postulated relative returns to research.   
Finally, the wide array of methods and model specifications used in the R&D evaluation 
literature constitute another source of variation in the rates of return estimates. The most 
common variables of this kind include the choice of the rate of return measure (e.g., real 
versus nominal), assumptions about the time profile of the benefits from R&D (e.g., 
trapezoidal, polynomial, or free form), assumptions on various lags (i.e., research lag, 
gestation lag, and adoption lag), assumptions on spillover effects and the presence (or 
not) of various distortions in the economy (e.g., exchange rate, environmental impacts, 
and deadweight loss from taxation), and so forth. Some but not all of these variables 
may have an expected influence on the estimate indicated by the methodology. For 
instance, holding other things constant, a lower internal rate of return estimate should be 
expected from a longer gestation lag, since a longer gestation lag imposes an even bigger 
discount on the benefits. The same effect also applies to research lag, the truncation of 
which is likely to lead to upwardly biased econometric estimates of the returns to R&D 
as discussed by Alston, Craig and Pardey (1998). These theoretically established 
relationships will be useful in validating our empirical model. 
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When implementing any meta-analysis study, there are variables, either factual or 
methodological, that will influence the reported effect size but are either unobservable or 
lack the proper measurement. This is especially pertinent for a meta-analysis of the 
agricultural R&D evaluation literature, where the attributes among studies can vary in so 
many different ways that it is infeasible to completely characterize each and every study. 
Perhaps the most relevant aspect is the time path of the costs and benefits associated 
with an investment in research, which is missing or incomplete in many of the published 
studies. By construction, IRR estimates are especially sensitive to variation in the 
patterns of benefits and costs over time. Another source of variation concerns the 
method by which the IRR is estimated. We use a categorical score to differentiate 
between estimates arising from self-evaluations versus “external” evaluations, which 
surely fail to fully capture the differences in the extent, quality, and treatment of the data 
developed by an evaluator from within an institution versus one form outside the 
institution whose research is being assessed. Likewise, using dummy variables are also 
likely to capture all the relevant sources of differences among estimates generated by 
econometric versus market model approaches. 
Correlation Within and Between Published Studies 
There is the potential for correlation among IRR estimates drawn from the same 
publications, only some of which is captured by the variables designed to account for the 
variation in IRRs. IRR estimates from the same study are likely to be correlated to the 
extent they share the same underlying data and entail similar model specifications and 
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other (undocumented) features by dint of their shared pedigrees. This interdependence 
among estimates can affect the statistical properties of a meta-analysis. The InSTePP 
rate-of-return database used for this study includes 2,049 IRRs drawn from 346 
published studies averaging 5.9 IRR estimates per study (and ranging from 1 to 72 IRRs 
in a given study, with a median of three.  
Moreover, IRR estimates sourced from different published studies may also be 
correlated to the extent they share common attributes, including, among other things, 
common or overlapping authorship. The InSTePP rate-of-return database has studies 
ranging from one to six author, with 578 unique author names across the 346 studies in 
version 3.0 of the database.40 Table 5-1 gives a rank order listing of the top 20 authors 
differentiated according to number of time an author was associated with a published 
study (Panel a) and the number of times an author was associated with a published IRR 
estimate. The top 20 authors (or just 3.5 percent of the all authors in the database) 
account for 15 percent of the studies and 31.7 percent of the IRR estimates, leaving open 
the real possibility of author-induced correlation among a substantial share of the 
estimates.  
Heteroskedasticity 
40 The structure of the database limited the number of recorded authors per publication to a maximum of 
six. Thus there is potential for undercounting authors, but only four (one percent) of the publications 
reported more than six authors.  
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In many meta-evaluation studies, the impact variable (or effect size) of interest, be it the 
effect of certain medical treatment, is itself a stochastic variable estimated with error. To 
the extent this error is heteroskedastic, such that estimates with lower variance are 
deemed more reliable than estimates with higher variance it is common in meta-analyses 
to weight impact variables, with more relievable variables receiving higher weight 
(Hedges and Olkin 1985). This issue is particularly salient for meta-analysis whose 
effect size is estimated by way of clinical trials with varying numbers of patients. In 
these instances it is common practice for meta analyses to use the sample sizes, 
estimated variances, or related t-statistics reported in the published study as weights 
when conducting the meta study.  
The nature of the data generation process is quite different for most if not all the 
research evaluation studies in the InSTePP database. IRR estimates in these evaluation 
studies reflect point estimates of the rate of return for a project, possibly under varying 
assumptions. Thus, they are not typically conceived as a stochastic variable. 
5.3 Empirical Model and Data 
Regression-based approaches using meta-evaluation methods have often been used to 
examine the likely source of variation in published effect-size estimates. Most economic 
studies use ordinary least squares (OLS) methods owing to their ease of implementation 
and interpretation (for example, Alston et al. 2000). In this context, this particular 
regression approach has several potential drawbacks. First, it fails to account for 
systematic unobservable factual and methodological variation across studies, and thus 
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may lead to biased coefficient estimates. Second, by failing to specify a proper 
covariance structure, OLS models will generate non-robust standard errors. A potential 
remedy is to use weighted least squares or even generalized least squares models, which 
require strong assumptions on the nature of the correlation. 
An alternative to using OLS methods is the panel data approach, particularly the fixed-
effect (FE) panel data model41, which can estimate a separate intercept for each panel 
but to do so requires multiple observations for each panel. The approach will not only 
consume degrees of freedom but by construction also reduces the sample size by 
excluding panels with a single observation, raising further concerns about sample 
selection. Moreover, the different number of observations across published studies will 
entail an unbalanced panel data model, which can further add to the heteroskedasticity 
problem (Baltagi 2005). 
Given the purpose of this meta-analysis, potential issues in the reported rate of return 
estimates, and the nature of the available data, we opted to use a random-effect-size 
multi-level approach. To illustrate, we use subscript j to denote individual rate of return 
estimate and subscript i to denote groups of individual estimates. Rosenberger and 
Loomis (2000) point out that there are several possible ways to stratify individual 
estimates into levels or groups, which may be stratified by publication or authorship. 
Clustering the IRR estimates into different groups according to authorship results in too 
41  The random-effect panel data model will produce virtually identical estimates to those using 
multilevel/hierarchical model to be introduced right below. 
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many groups to generate efficient estimates for this analysis. We therefore proceeded by 
grouping individual IRR estimates according to their source publication, which in some 
instances were further grouped by their refereed versus non-refereed status as a 
robustness check.  
Let  represent the j-th rate-of-return estimate obtained from the i-th published study 
with  as the total number of estimates across studies. The multilevel model is 
written as 
(5-1)   
In equation 5-1,  is a constant term,  is a vector of explanatory variables, and  is the 
corresponding vector of marginal effects. Moreover,  is a level-one error term, which 
shows how an individual rate-of-return estimate deviates from the mean rate of return of 
the published study from which it comes, while  is a level-two error term, which 
shows how the mean of the rate of return from one particular published study deviates 
from the overall mean rate of return averaged across all studies. We assume  and  to 
be independent and normally distributed with zero mean and a variance of  and , 
respectively. In this way, each individual rate-of-return estimate  is modeled as a 
random draw from a distribution with a random mean  instead of one with 
a deterministic mean  as indicated in the GLS model, thereby controlling for 
the systematic unobserved variation. With this setup, the intercept  is now random 
across each of the published studies while the slope parameters  are constant. Thus we 
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are estimating a random intercept rather than a random slope multilevel model, where  
varies across published studies42. Finally, in order to derive consistent estimates for , 
the random intercept  is assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables 
, and the error term is also assumed to be independent of . 
To mitigate the influence of outliers, we use the natural log of the IRRs which 
introduces two additional estimation consequences for this meta-analysis. First, 
observations reporting a non-positive IRR estimate must be excluded from the 
regression analysis, raising concerns over potential sample selection bias. In practice this 
is likely to be of little consequence in this study. There are just 31 non-positive IRR 
estimates out of a total of 2,049 estimates; barely 1.5 percent of the total. Second, the 
logarithmic transformation ameliorates the effects of outliers. Figure 5-1 shows that the 
distribution of IRR estimates in our sample are right-skewed distribution. The mean is 
67.6 percent per year and 50 percent of the observations lie in the range of 24.6 to 72.9 
percent per year. There are 512 observations in the upper tail of the distribution above 
the 3rd quartile, the maximum being 5,645 percent per year. By contrast, the distribution 
of the logarithmic transformation of the IRRs is close to normal43, and the range is much 
reduced, thus diminishing concerns about unrepresentative or overly influential 
observations, especially in the upper tail of the distribution. 
42 An alternative is to estimate a random slope multilevel model, which significantly increases the number 
of parameters to be estimated. In fact, the underlying maximum likelihood estimation fails to converge for 
such a model using our data.  
43 Applying a skewness and kurtosis test for normality to the sample of 2,018 logarithmic IRR estimates, 
we reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution based on the calculated p-value of 0.0000. 
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Following the common practice of meta-analysis using stratified survey data, we opted 
to use the number of IRR estimates in each published study as weights to normalize the 
contribution of each published study in accounting for variation in the reported returns to 
research. For example, if study A contains three estimates and study B contains only 
one, then the IRR estimates from study A are each assigned a weight of one third (given 
these estimates are likely to be highly correlated), while the sole IRR estimate from 
study B enters the analysis unweighted (i.e., implicitly has a weight of one). 
As did Alston et al. (2000), the variables we used to account for variation in the reported 
rates of return were notionally grouped into four basic categories: characteristics of the 
rate of return measure, characteristics of the analyst (in this instance, the first author of 
each published study), characteristics of the research project, and characteristics of the 
research evaluation. Our regression sample contains 1,303 IRR estimates from 241 
published studies44. Comparing this regression sample to the remaining 746 IRRs in the 
full sample of the InSTePP database using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
we reject the equality of the distributions (D=0.10, p<0.00). Table 5-2 presents the 
summary statistics of the reported IRRs in the regression sample conditional on (most of 
the) explanatory variables. Most of the variables are dummies generated from the 
corresponding categorical factors used in the survey book, such as the geographical 
location of the research performer and commodity focus of the research. Continuous 
44 By comparison, Alston et al.’s (2000) study included 1,128 IRR observations in their regression analysis 
out of a total of 1,884 observations. The 756 excluded observations lacked information on one or more of 
the required explanatory variables.  
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variables used in this analysis include the publication date (by year) of each published 
study, the first year when the research investment was made, as well as the total research 
lag and the gestation lag, which were both measured in years. In addition, we add an 
interaction term between nominal IRR and developing countries and one between 
nominal IRR and developing countries for reasons argued in Alston et al. (2000). 
5.4 Results and Interpretation 
Stata’s xtmixed command was used to estimate Equation (5-1) with relevant syntax 
specifications. Appendix Table 5-3 shows the estimation outputs, which are divided into 
three sections. On top right of the table is descriptive information about the multilevel 
regression analysis, such as the number of groups (i.e., published studies) included in the 
regression. Then upper section of the table provides estimates of the constant term and 
the associated explanatory variables, . The lower part of the table reports the estimates 
for the variance components,  and . Based on information in this table, we can 
compute the intra-class correlation (ICC), which measures how strongly individual 
observations in the same group resemble each other. The ICC estimator used in this 
study is defined as 
(5-2) 
 
 
Substituting 0.35 for  and 0.24 for , the ICC is estimated to be 0.59, meaning that 
after controlling for the explanatory variables, 59 percent of the overall variance in the 
reported IRR estimates is attributable to differences in the IRRs among published studies 
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with the remaining 41 percent attributable to differences in the IRRs within the same 
published studies.  
Calculation of Marginal Effects on IRR 
The dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic form in this regression model, 
whereas we are ultimately interested in the marginal effects of each of the explanatory 
variables (or a group of explanatory variables) on IRR (in level or natural form). To 
translate the estimates for , which are merely semi-elasticity estimates, into the 
marginal effects of each explanatory variable on IRR, requires calculating the 
corresponding percentage effects; that is, the percentage change in the dependent 
variable given a marginal change in each of the explanatory variables. The nature of the 
transformation is different for continuous versus discrete (or dummy) variables, both of 
which appear in our model. For each of the continuous variables, we multiply their 
respective  estimates by 100; for each of the discrete or dummy variables we use the 
almost-unbiased estimator suggested by Kennedy (1981)45. Table 5-4 displays the 
estimated percentage effects of all explanatory variables with their corresponding 
statistics.   
45 There is a well-established literature on interpreting a dummy variable’s coefficient when the dependent 
variable has been log-transformed (in other words, when it is a log-linear model). David Giles (1982) 
derived the exact minimum variance unbiased estimator for the percentage effects. However, the 
calculation is rather convoluted and in practice it adds very little improvement to Kennedy (1981)’s 
estimator (Steward, 2004). Therefore, here we choose Kennedy’s estimator for convenience without too 
much loss of accuracy. 
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The second step in estimating marginal effects is to fix the IRR at a reference level to 
which the marginal changes are applied. Given that most of our explanatory variables 
are dummy variables generated from categorical factors, a sensible approach is to take 
the minimum value, i.e., zero, of those variables as the reference level. By doing that, we 
are setting the reference IRR at a level where the default categories prevail, i.e., the real-
term, average IRR for privately-funded research and so on and so forth (See Table 5-2 
for the default categories). For the continuous variables we benchmark the analysis at 
the mean values for the gestation lag (4.4 years) and the research lag, (21.6 years) and 
set both the publication date and beginning year of investment at 2000. Doing this means 
that our assessment of the marginal effects of each explanatory variable on the IRR to 
investments in R&D are somewhat comparable to those reported in Alston et al. (2000). 
With this calibration, the benchmark IRR for assessing the marginal effects derived from 
the multilevel regression model is 53.38 percent per year, which is the point of reference 
for the marginal effects reported in Table 5-5, Column 1. For comparison, Table 5-5, 
Column 2 presents the same marginal effects, again using the multilevel model but this 
time benchmarked off the mean value of the IRRs in the regression sample which is 
65.87 percent per year.46 Further, we estimate two alternative OLS models, one with 
IRR as the dependent variable and the other with the log-form IRR, and calculated the 
respective marginal effects. These are presented in Columns 3 and 4 respectively of 
46 The median value of the IRRs used in the regression is 44 percent per year.  
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Table 5-5. It is evident that different model specifications return different, in some cases 
quite different, marginal effect estimates. 
Interpretation of Marginal Effects 
The explanatory variables that have statistically significant and positive marginal effects 
on the IRR estimate include University researcher, Private research performer, Crops, 
Livestock, and Spill-outs. Those variables that have significant negative marginal effects 
include Marginal IRR, Extension Only, Research & extension, International funder, 
Private sector researcher, Public and private R&D, Program evaluated, Institution-
wide, Multi-institutions, Pivotal demand shift, Lag gestation, and Spill-ins.  
(1) Characteristics of the rate of return measure 
Firstly, marginal IRR estimates are found to be more than 9 percentage points lower than 
average IRR estimates. Compared with Research only (the default group), the IRRs to 
Extension only and Research and extension are found to be 25 and 6 percentage points 
lower respectively, a relationship that is statistically significant and consistent with our 
expectation. This is because the cost of extension effort is not accounted for in the 
research-only measures, whereas extension effects are difficult to exclude from the 
benefit stream (Alston et al. 2000). Social rates of return to research should be greater 
than private returns provided that there are positive spillovers. However, our finding 
suggests no difference between social and private rates of return. Some think ex post 
studies are likely to report higher than normal IRRs to the extent the studies are cherry 
picked and thus more likely to evaluate “successful” research. Alternatively, ex post 
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studies may report smaller than normal IRRs to the extent they are based on observed 
past outcomes rather than the hypothetical, and perhaps overly optimistic, future 
outcomes that are incorporated into ex ante studies. We reveal no significant difference 
between ex post versus ex ante IRRs, holding other things constant.  
Some caution is warranted when assessing the marginal effect of the nominal-term IRR 
measure, as this effect is jointly determined by the coefficient estimates for Nominal 
ROR, its interaction term with Developing countries, and its interaction term with the 
period of the 1970s. None of the three coefficient estimates are statistically significant 
though the joint effects may be deemed influential in an economic sense. Our results 
suggest that, other things held equal, the nominal IRR for agricultural research carried 
out in a developing country is more than 6 percentage points (7.99 minus 1.67) higher 
than its counterparts in real terms. It also suggests that the nominal IRR for a research 
investment made in the inflationary 1970s is as much as 12.3 percentage points (13.94 
minus 1.67) higher than those in other periods.  
(2) Characteristics of the analyst 
There are appreciable differences in the estimated IRRs among authors with different 
institutional affiliations. For example, researchers associated with universities tend to 
report IRRs that are 11 percentage points higher than those associated with governments 
(the default group). Meanwhile, the IRRs reported in self-evaluation studies are more 
than 10 percentage points higher than otherwise, although this difference is not 
statistically significant. 
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(3) Characteristics of the research 
Among all the types of institutional affiliations we tagged in our study, research 
performed by private institutions (134 cases in the regression sample) yields IRRs that 
are 26 percentage points higher than the IRRs for other types of institutions. With 
research classified as All agriculture being the default group, IRRs are about 21 
percentage points higher for crop research and 18 percentage points higher for livestock 
research. Compared with research that is either publicly or privately funded research, 
research that is jointly funded by both sources report significantly lower IRRs (nearly 14 
percentage points). Notably, our results suggest there is no significant difference 
between IRRs for research done in developed versus developing countries, or between 
basic research and non-basic research (i.e., applied research, extension, and research 
jointly with extension). Finally, and of significant policy interest, after accounting for a 
host of methodological and other attributes that affect the returns to research we find no 
evidence that these returns have been trending either up or down over time. Across all 
model specification, the coefficient on the Beginning year of costs variable is trivially 
small and lacks statistical significance.  
(4) Characteristics of research evaluation 
The sign and relative size of the estimated coefficients for variables proxying differences 
among studies in their evaluation methodologies are more predictable, and thus useful in 
assessing the suitability of our model. For example, more aggregative studies (that 
encompass successful and unsuccessful research) are more likely to report lower rates of 
return, a prior that is consistent with our estimated effects for Program evaluated, 
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Institution-wide and Multi-institutions where Single Project is the default group. We 
estimate that increasing the gestation lag by a year reduces the IRR by about 3.8 
percentage points, again consistent with our priors. Likewise, the sign on the research 
lag coefficient is negative, meaning longer lags are associated with lower IRRs. This is 
also consistent with our priors, and although the magnitude of the estimated effect is 
sizable, the coefficient is statistically insignificant  
Both Spillins and Spillouts report statistically significant coefficient estimates with 
opposite signs that is also conforms to our priors. When the spill-in of benefits from 
other research projects is excluded from the target region, our model suggests that the 
rate of return estimate will be 12 percentages lower than otherwise. In contrast, when 
spillout benefits are included, the estimated IRR is more than 25 percentages higher than 
if these benefits were ignored, as one would expect. Finally, when both spill-in and spill-
out benefits are accounted for the net effect is intrinsically ambiguous. In our study, this 
net effect is statistically insignificant. 
One might expect refereed studies to report more conservative estimates (that may be 
more likely to make it past the scrutiny of reviewers and editors alike) and we find that 
to be the case (although the difference is not statistically significant). In fact, some of the 
more implausible IRR estimates in our regression sample (e.g., the highest estimate of 
5,645 percent per year) were sourced to refereed studies.  
As a robustness check of our model, we estimated a random-intercept three-level model 
with publication type added as the third level in order to test more formally whether 
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refereed versus non refereed publications account for systematic differences in the 
reported IRRs. Our results indicate that the variation between the two groups explains a 
minimal amount of the overall variation, thereby fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no systematic difference between refereed and non-referenced publications in 
the agricultural R&D literature. 
Finally , a number of remaining methodological attributes—such as publication date, 
distorting policy effects, and supply/demand system assumptions—were of little if any 
statistically significant consequence in accounting for measured variation in the reported 
IRR to research. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reports the results of a meta-analysis of the sources of variation in 1,303 
IRR estimates gleaned from 241 published studies over the past half century on the 
returns to agricultural research around the world. After controlling for unexplainable 
heterogeneity, correlation, and other methodological issues, we identified factual and 
methodological variables that account for the variation in the reported IRRs. Among the 
factual variables, i.e., those associated with different aspects of an R&D investment, the 
public versus private nature of R&D, its commodity orientation, the institutional 
affiliation of the analyst and the research performer all have significant influences on the 
IRR estimates. Methodological variables that were statistically significant in accounting 
for variation in the reported IRRs included the scope of R&D, the type of IRR measure 
(i.e., marginal versus average), the institutional orientation of the R&D, assumptions 
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about the supply/demand shift, the presence or absence of spillover effects, and the 
length of gestation lag.  
These findings have several important implications. First they reveal that differences in 
the methodological approaches employed by different studies have measurable and 
significant consequences for the measured IRR to research. A failure to fully document 
these methodological differences compromises the value of these evaluation efforts, 
especially if the estimated rates of return are being compared with ostensibly similar 
measures from other studies. Secondly, our findings help clarify long-standing 
speculations concerning several important policy-related issues. After accounting for 
multiple sources of variation in the reported returns to R&D, we find in favor of higher-
than-average rates of return crops and livestock research vis-à-vis other types of research 
(such as research on natural resource issues). Our results also indicate there is no 
appreciable difference in returns to agricultural R&D performed in developed versus 
developing countries, and, critically, that the returns to investments in agricultural R&D 
have not waned over time. The payoffs to recent spending on food and agricultural R&D 
appear as high as they were in yesteryears. This calls into serious question the 
widespread decline in the rate of growth of investment in (public) food and agricultural 
R&D, especially if the purpose of those investments is to sustain and spur productivity 
growth ion agriculture that eventually reveals itself in the returns to R&D estimates 
studied here. 
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Data source: Hurley, Rao, and Pardey (2014). 
Figure 5-1 Kernel Distribution of the Reported Rate of Return Estimates 
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Data source: Hurley, Rao, and Pardey (2014). 
Figure 5-2 Moving Median of Reported Internal Rates of Return Over Time 
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Table 5-1 Contributions by Top Authors to Rate of Return Primary Studies and 
Estimates  
 
Panel a  Contributions to Primary Studies                 Panel b  Contributions to Estimates 
Rank Author 
No. of 
studies Percent 
 
Rank Author 
No. of 
estimates Percent 
1 Evenson R 30 2.53  1 Evenson R 227 4.34 
2 Thirtle C 17 1.43  2 Araji A 141 2.70 
3 Norton G 11 0.93  3 Norton G 136 2.60 
4 Davis J 9 0.76  4 Alston J 117 2.24 
5 Scobie G 9 0.76  5 Thirtle C 111 2.12 
6 Araji A 8 0.67  6 Pardey G 103 1.97 
7 Avila A 8 0.67 
 
7 
Brinkman 
G 84 1.61 
8 
Brinkman 
G 8 0.67 
 
8 Dey M 73 1.40 
9 Fox G 8 0.67  9 Fox G 68 1.30 
10 Huffman W 8 0.67  10 Prein M 65 1.24 
11 Mullen J 8 0.67  11 Briones R 64 1.22 
12 Alston J 7 0.59  12 Stobutzki I 64 1.22 
13 Byerlee D 7 0.59 
 
13 
Anderson 
M 55 1.05 
14 Lubulwa G 7 0.59  14 James J 55 1.05 
15 
Bottomley 
P 6 0.51 
 
15 Byerlee D 53 1.01 
16 Pardey G 6 0.51  16 Scobie G 53 1.01 
17 Traxler G 6 0.51  17 Sim R 52 0.99 
18 White F 6 0.51  18 Nagy J 47 0.90 
19 Fan S 5 0.42  19 Mullen J 46 0.88 
20 Khatri Y 5 0.42  20 Lu Y-C 43 0.82 
 
Sum 179 15.08   Sum 1,657 31.69 
 
Total 1,187 100.00   Total  5,229 100.00 
Source: Developed by authors. 
 
  
 Table 5-2 Conditional Mean Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for Explanatory Variables in Regression Data Set 
 Summary Statistics   Summary Statistics 
Default category Count Mean S.D.  Explanatory variables Count Mean S.D. 
                                                               (percentage)                                                                     (percentage) 
Characteristics of the rate of return measure 
Real 1,076 65.26 103.10  Nominal  227 68.77 56.20 
Ex ante evaluation 170 70.27 170.13  Ex post 1,133 65.21 80.02 
Average 724 56.23 91.01  Marginal 579 77.93 101.91 
Private  96 40.79 102.32  Social 1,207 67.87 95.87 
Research only 751 77.25 118.72  Extension only 42 88.63 103.06 
     Research & extension 510 47.25 40.63 
  Characteristics of the analyst (first author) 
First author affiliation – government 223 74.30 148.37  University researcher 876 68.09 88.76 
     International researcher 82 47.27 26.57 
     International funder 17 35.95 26.53 
     Private sector researcher 48 47.51 41.31 
     Unknown affiliation 57 49.90 46.17 
Independent assessment 831 61.77 74.39  Self-evaluation 215 67.19 144.30 
     Unclear evaluation type 257 78.04 109.00 
Characteristics of the R&D 
Government research performer 977 60.13 82.46  University research performer 337 80.89 104.42 
     International organization research 
performer 
63 44.23 24.10 
     Private researcher performer 134 57.22 45.10 
     Unknown research performer 200 74.78 130.67 
Commodity focus -- All agriculture   698 59.77 84.55  Crops 147 66.99 61.71 
     Livestock 305 72.13 117.15 
     Natural resource & forestry 25 46.49 33.04 
     Aquaculture & fishery 8 25.25 6.23 
     Other commodity 120 90.81 138.14 
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Table 5-2 continued 
 
    
 Summary Statistics   Summary Statistics 
Default category Count Mean S.D.  Explanatory variables Count Mean S.D. 
Scope of R&D specified as non-basic  1,298 65.98 96.72  Basic research 5 38.82 39.82 
Public R&D 1,120 64.29 94.35  Private R&D 13 79.77 68.11 
     Public and private R&D 170 75.26 111.62 
Developing country performers 536 56.68 60.28  Developed country performer 697 74.24 116.76 
Characteristics of the R&D evaluation 
Single project evaluated 829 74.66 115.91  Program evaluated 249 52.02 48.18 
     Institution-wide 209 48.60 35.33 
     Multi-institution 16 51.63 19.20 
Non-refereed publication 885 68.52 107.27  Refereed publication 418 60.27 68.43 
Non-econometrically estimated supply 
shift 
701 53.82 93.81  Econometric supply shift 602 79.91 97.92 
Benefits calculated using an implicit 
surplus model 
829 74.66 115.91  Pivotal supply shift 249 52.01 48.18 
     Parallel supply shift 209 48.60 35.33 
     Pivotal demand shift 0 N.A. N.A. 
     Parallel demand shift 16 51.63 19.20 
Industry data for supply shift 906 67.71 84.71  Experimental data 397 61.68 119.33 
Spillovers not considered 1,014 60.00 95.99  Spill-ins 173 108.64 106.24 
     Spill-outs 19 128.02 123.84 
     Both spill-ins and spill-outs 97 38.80 31.66 
Distortions not considered 1,084 69.27 104.52  Farm program distortion 93 53.79 30.94 
     Exchange rate distortion 70 52.66 36.78 
     Deadweight losses from taxation 8 53.85 36.98 
     Environmental impacts 0 N.A. N.A. 
     Other distortion  0 N.A. N.A. 
Overall IRR 1,303 65.87 96.57      
Source: Developed by authors. 
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Table 5-3 Stata xtmixed Output for a Random Intercept Two-Level Model 
 
 
Mixed-effects regression                                 Number of observations      =      1303 
Group variable: Publication ID                                    Number of groups   =       241 
                                                            Observations per group: minimum   =         1 
                                                                                                       Average  =       5.4 
                                                                                                    Maximum  =        55 
                                                                                             Wald chi2(47)   =    564.54 
Log pseudolikelihood = -12446.451                                  Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
(Std. Errors adjusted for 241 clusters in Publication ID) 
 
ln_ROR Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Nominal IRR -0.0168 0.1731 -0.1000 0.9230 -0.3560 0.3224 
Publication date -0.0081 0.0077 -1.0500 0.2940 -0.0232 0.0070 
Nominal IRR × 
developing 
countries 
0.1566 0.1859 0.8400 0.4000 -0.2078 0.5211 
Nominal IRR × 
1970s 0.2453 0.1631 1.5000 0.1330 
-
0.0744 0.5649 
Ex post study 0.0723 0.2053 0.3500 0.7250 -0.3301 0.4748 
Marginal IRR -0.1728 0.1140 -1.5200 0.1300 -0.3962 0.0506 
Social IRR -0.2374 0.6459 -0.3700 0.7130 -1.5034 1.0285 
Extension only -0.5562 0.4073 -1.3700 0.1720 -1.3546 0.2421 
Research & 
Extension -0.1196 0.0498 -2.4000 0.0160 
-
0.2173 
-
0.0219 
University 
researcher 0.1999 0.1233 1.6200 0.1050 
-
0.0418 0.4416 
International 
researcher -0.1461 0.2117 -0.6900 0.4900 
-
0.5611 0.2689 
International funder -0.5636 0.3643 -1.5500 0.1220 -1.2775 0.1504 
Private sector 
researcher -0.5876 0.3078 -1.9100 0.0560 
-
1.1909 0.0157 
Unknown affiliation 0.0177 0.2370 0.0700 0.9400 -0.4469 0.4823 
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Self evaluation 0.1846 0.1317 1.4000 0.1610 -0.0735 0.4428 
Unclear evaluation 
type 0.2001 0.1458 1.3700 0.1700 
-
0.0856 0.4858 
University research 
performer 0.3705 0.2312 1.6000 0.1090 
-
0.0827 0.8236 
Intl institute 
research performer -0.0356 0.1387 -0.2600 0.7970 
-
0.3075 0.2362 
Private research 
performer 0.4270 0.2436 1.7500 0.0800 
-
0.0504 0.9044 
Unknown research 
performer -0.0892 0.1694 -0.5300 0.5980 
-
0.4212 0.2428 
Crops 0.3352 0.0984 3.4100 0.0010 0.1424 0.5280 
Livestock 0.2964 0.0803 3.6900 0.0000 0.1389 0.4538 
Natural resource & 
forestry 0.1294 0.2544 0.5100 0.6110 
-
0.3692 0.6280 
Aquaculture & 
fishery -0.0759 0.7485 -0.1000 0.9190 
-
1.5429 1.3911 
Other commodity 0.2747 0.1882 1.4600 0.1440 -0.0940 0.6435 
Basic research 0.2464 0.3568 0.6900 0.4900 -0.4530 0.9457 
Private R&D -0.1889 0.4750 -0.4000 0.6910 -1.1200 0.7421 
Public and Private 
R&D -0.2971 0.0912 -3.2600 0.0010 
-
0.4759 
-
0.1184 
Developed country 
performer -0.1147 0.1421 -0.8100 0.4200 
-
0.3932 0.1638 
Program evaluated -0.4084 0.0720 -5.6700 0.0000 -0.5494 
-
0.2673 
Institution-wide -0.2123 0.1787 -1.1900 0.2350 -0.5626 0.1379 
Multi-institutions -0.2424 0.1370 -1.7700 0.0770 -0.5109 0.0261 
Refereed 
publication -0.0275 0.1003 -0.2700 0.7840 
-
0.2241 0.1691 
Econometric supply 
shift 0.0139 0.1532 0.0900 0.9280 
-
0.2863 0.3140 
Pivotal supply shift 0.0258 0.1415 0.1800 0.8550 -0.2516 0.3032 
Parallel supply shift -0.0063 0.1891 -0.0300 0.9730 -0.3769 0.3643 
Pivotal demand shift -0.6806 0.1450 -4.6900 0.0000 - -
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0.9649 0.3963 
Experimental data 
for supply shift -0.1128 0.2600 -0.4300 0.6640 
-
0.6224 0.3968 
Research lag -0.0028 0.0100 -0.2800 0.7780 -0.0225 0.0168 
Gestation lag -0.0709 0.0401 -1.7700 0.0770 -0.1496 0.0077 
Spill-ins -0.2573 0.0723 -3.5600 0.0000 -0.3989 
-
0.1156 
Spill-outs 0.4008 0.1180 3.4000 0.0010 0.1695 0.6320 
Both spill-ins and 
spill-outs 0.2694 0.2697 1.0000 0.3180 
-
0.2591 0.7980 
Farm program 
distortion -0.0427 0.1570 -0.2700 0.7860 
-
0.3505 0.2651 
Exchange rate 
distortion 0.0529 0.1056 0.5000 0.6160 
-
0.1541 0.2599 
Environmental 
impact distortion -0.2317 0.3155 -0.7300 0.4630 
-
0.8502 0.3867 
Deadweight loss 
distortion 0.0000 (omitted)     
Other distortion 0.0000 (omitted)     Beginning year of 
costs 0.0004 0.0005 0.8800 0.3790 
-
0.0005 0.0013 
Constant 19.6505 15.8216 1.2400 0.2140 
-
11.359
3 
50.660
2 
 
Random-effects Parameters Estimate Robust Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Publication ID: Identity 
    Variance (Constant) 0.3502 0.0475 0.2684 0.4568 
Variance (Residual) 0.2380 0.0401 0.1711 0.3311 
Source: Developed by authors. 
Notes:  
1. The coded variable names have been replaced with the corresponding economic names. 
2. The estimates for Deadweight loss distortion and Other distortion are omitted because 
of collinearity in the data. 
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Table 5-4 Estimates of Percentage Effect on the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
Measure 
 
                                                                                  Number of observations = 1,303 
Variables Percentage 
Effect 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Nominal IRR -3.13 16.64 -0.19 0.43 -35.78 29.52 
Publication date -0.81 0.77 -1.05 0.15 -2.32 0.70 
Nominal IRR × 
developing countries 
14.95 21.19 0.71 0.24 -26.62 56.53 
Nominal IRR × 1970s 26.11 20.43 1.28 0.10 -13.97 66.19 
Ex post study 5.26 21.39 0.25 0.40 -36.70 47.22 
Marginal IRR -16.42** 9.50 -1.73 0.04 -35.05 2.22 
Social IRR -35.98 37.39 -0.96 0.17 -109.33 37.37 
Extension only -47.23** 20.63 -2.29 0.01 -87.71 -6.75 
Research & Extension -11.38*** 4.41 -2.58 0.01 -20.04 -2.72 
University researcher 21.20* 14.89 1.42 0.08 -8.01 50.41 
International researcher -15.51 17.69 -0.88 0.19 -50.21 19.20 
International funder -46.74*** 18.78 -2.49 0.01 -83.57 -9.90 
Private sector researcher -47.00*** 15.93 -2.95 0.00 -78.26 -15.75 
Unknown affiliation -1.03 23.13 -0.04 0.48 -46.42 44.35 
Self evaluation 19.24 15.64 1.23 0.11 -11.44 49.92 
Unclear evaluation type 20.86 17.52 1.19 0.12 -13.52 55.24 
University research 
performer 
41.02 32.17 1.28 0.10 -22.10 104.14 
Intl institute research 
performer 
-4.42 13.19 -0.34 0.37 -30.31 21.46 
Private research 
performer 
48.79** 35.71 1.37 0.09 -21.27 118.85 
Unknown research 
performer 
-9.84 15.17 -0.65 0.26 -39.59 19.91 
Crops 39.15*** 13.66 2.87 0.00 12.35 65.94 
Livestock 34.06*** 10.75 3.17 0.00 12.97 55.16 
Natural resource & 
forestry 
10.19 27.58 0.37 0.36 -43.92 64.30 
Aquaculture & fishery -29.95 45.87 -0.65 0.26 -119.95 60.04 
Other commodity 29.31 24.12 1.22 0.11 -18.00 76.62 
Basic research 20.05 41.50 0.48 0.31 -61.38 101.47 
Private R&D -26.05 33.24 -0.78 0.22 -91.26 39.16 
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Public and Private R&D -26.01*** 6.73 -3.86 0.00 -39.22 -12.80 
Developed country 
performer 
-11.73 12.48 -0.94 0.17 -36.21 12.75 
Program evaluated -33.70*** 4.76 -7.07 0.00 -43.05 -24.35 
Institution-wide -20.41* 14.11 -1.45 0.07 -48.09 7.27 
Multi-institutions -22.26** 10.60 -2.10 0.02 -43.05 -1.46 
Refereed publication -3.20 9.69 -0.33 0.37 -22.20 15.80 
Econometric supply 
shift 
0.21 15.26 0.01 0.49 -29.72 30.15 
Pivotal supply shift 1.59 14.31 0.11 0.46 -26.48 29.66 
Parallel supply shift -2.39 18.29 -0.13 0.45 -38.28 33.50 
Pivotal demand shift -49.90*** 7.23 -6.90 0.00 -64.08 -35.72 
Experimental data for 
supply shift 
-13.64 22.08 -0.62 0.27 -56.96 29.68 
Research lag -0.28 1.00 -0.28 0.39 -2.25 1.69 
Gestation lag -7.09** 4.01 -1.77 0.04 -14.97 0.78 
Spill-ins -22.88*** 5.57 -4.11 0.00 -33.81 -11.96 
Spill-outs 48.26*** 17.43 2.77 0.00 14.06 82.46 
Both spill-ins and spill-
outs 
26.25 33.43 0.79 0.22 -39.34 91.84 
Farm program distortion -5.35 14.77 -0.36 0.36 -34.33 23.63 
Exchange rate distortion 4.85 11.04 0.44 0.33 -16.81 26.51 
Environmental impact 
distortion 
-24.54 23.23 -1.06 0.15 -70.11 21.04 
Deadweight loss 
distortion 
0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Other distortion 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Beginning year of costs 0.04 0.05 0.88 0.19 -0.05 0.13 
Source: Developed by authors. 
Note:  
1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2. The percentage effect coefficient and its standard error are calculated from the estimates in 
Figure 3 using Kennedy (1981)’s estimators.  
3. All the numbers in this table should be interpreted as percentage change. Take the 
coefficient estimate for Marginal IRR, -8.77, for example. It means, other variables held 
constant, marginal IRR estimate will be 8.77 percentage lower than average IRR estimate. 
 
  
137 
Table 5-5 Estimates of Marginal Effects on the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
Measure 
 
Number of observations = 1,303 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nominal IRR -1.67 -2.06 -50.49*** -32.23*** 
Publication date -0.43 -0.53 0.8 -0.76*** 
Nominal IRR × developing countries 7.99 9.85 47.25*** 39.01*** 
Nominal IRR × 1970s 13.94 17.20 26.6 22.47** 
Ex post study 2.81 3.47 17.83 16.28** 
Marginal IRR -8.77** -10.82** 29.06*** 13.51* 
Social IRR -19.21 -23.71 25.51 18.19* 
Extension only -25.22** -31.12** -29.1* -26.69** 
Research & Extension -6.08*** -7.50*** -48.56*** -21.22*** 
University researcher 11.32* 13.97* -12.72 4.67 
International researcher -8.28 -10.22 15.27 31.10*** 
International funder -24.96*** -30.80*** 13.18 20.89 
Private sector researcher -25.10*** -30.98*** -60.67*** -40.86*** 
Unknown affiliation -0.55 -0.68 -34.98* -8.57 
Self evaluation 10.27 12.68 4.74 0.87 
Unclear evaluation type 11.14 13.75 12.58 12.32** 
University research performer 21.91 27.03 -11.41 -15.22*** 
Intl institute research performer -2.36 -2.92 13.19 -1.61 
Private research performer 26.05** 32.15** 23.66* 7.31 
Unknown research performer -5.25 -6.48 7.59 6.19 
Crops 20.90*** 25.80*** -23.79 13.97* 
Livestock 18.19*** 22.45*** -40.85*** 6.32 
Natural resource & forestry 5.44 6.71 -61.72** -4.32 
Aquaculture & fishery -16.00 -19.74 -54.76*** -16.67 
Other commodity 15.65 19.31 8.27 37.63*** 
Basic research 10.70 13.21 5.68 -7.97 
Private R&D -13.91 -17.17 15.27 25.04 
Public and Private R&D -13.89*** -17.14*** -5.22 8.96 
Developed country performer -6.26 -7.73 36.54*** 15.82*** 
Program evaluated -17.99*** -22.21*** -23.29** -16.87** 
Institution-wide -10.90* -13.45* -10.62 -0.82 
Multi-institutions -11.89** -14.67** -59.54*** -28.27*** 
Refereed publication -1.71 -2.11 -25.73** -14.43*** 
Econometric supply shift 0.11 0.14 -32.94*** 1.48 
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Pivotal supply shift 0.85 1.05 -9.29 -4.76 
Parallel supply shift -1.27 -1.57 -10.02 -4.10 
Pivotal demand shift -26.65*** -32.88*** -52.34 -30.78** 
Experimental data for supply shift -7.28 -8.99 15.77** 14.56** 
Research lag -0.15 -0.19 -1.44** -0.93*** 
Gestation lag -3.79** -4.67** -3.49*** -3.57*** 
Spill-ins -12.22*** -15.08*** 54.98*** 38.88*** 
Spill-outs 25.77*** 31.80*** 63.65** 45.80*** 
Both spill-ins and spill-outs 14.02 17.30 -37.48** 5.98 
Farm program distortion -2.86 -3.53 5.21 7.91* 
Exchange rate distortion 2.59 3.20 -21.99* -3.51 
Environmental impact distortion -13.10 -16.17 -46.98 -5.88 
Deadweight loss distortion 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 
Other distortion 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 
Beginning year of costs 0.02 0.03 0 -0.02*** 
Source: Developed by authors. 
Note:  
1. Column (1) and (2) display the marginal effects of the percentage effects on IRR (see Table 
5-3) at different IRR levels, i.e., Column (1) at IRR=53.40 percent (the reference level 
preferred by this study) and Column (2) at IRR=65.90 percent (the mean value of IRR 
estimates in the regression sample). Column (3) and (4) displays the marginal effects 
calculated using the OLS approach. More specifically, Column (3) simply estimates an OLS 
model with IRR as the dependent variable; Column (4) first estimates an OLS model with the 
log-form IRR as the dependent variable and then calculate the marginal effects using Kennedy 
(1981)’s estimators. 
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. All the numbers in this table should be interpreted as changes in percentage points. Take the 
coefficient estimate for Marginal IRR, -8.77, for example. It means, other variables held 
constant, marginal IRR estimate in will be 8.77 percentage points lower than average IRR 
estimate. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine both empirical and methodological issues 
related to agricultural production efficiency and productivity. Four chapters are 
organized under two different research lines.  
Chapter 2 looks into land fragmentation, also known as scattered land holdings, a 
common phenomenon in agriculture around the world. It evaluates the effect of land 
fragmentation on agricultural production and hypothesizes that it may be beneficial to 
farmers by diversifying risk onto separate land plots that usually have heterogeneous 
growing conditions. Applying a stochastic frontier model to the Tanzania Living 
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) data, this chapter finds evidence to support the 
risk-reduction hypothesis and indications that land fragmentation is positively associated 
with efficiency. It is further argued that accounting for risk preferences that are absent 
from the current framework in future research may help explain the double dividends of 
land fragmentation. 
Chapter 3 hypothesizes that by reducing production risk, land fragmentation may 
encourage risk-averse farmers to increase their optimal labor use, thus leading to a 
higher payoff in spite of its negative effects on technical efficiency. Further it is argued 
that land fragmentation’s impacts on production efficiency and risk are interrelated 
through farmer’s risk preferences, an element which is absent from the current analytical 
framework. A production model is developed to incorporate production efficiency, 
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production risk, and risk preferences. Numeric examples are used to support the 
aforementioned hypothesis and it is found that ignoring risk preferences from efficiency 
analysis will generally generate biased or even misleading estimates. 
Chapter 4 examines the agricultural R&D evaluation literature by scrutinizing 2,242 
investment evaluations reported in 372 separate studies from 1958 to 2011. It is found 
that the internal rate of return (IRR) is the predominant summary measure of investment 
performance used in the literature despite methodological criticisms dating back more 
than a half century. The reported IRRs imply rates of return that are implausibly high. 
This chapter investigates the reasons for these implausibly high estimates by analytically 
comparing the IRR to the modified internal rate of return (MIRR). The MIRR addresses 
several methodological concerns with using the IRR, has the intuitive interpretation as 
the annual compounding interest rate paid by an investment, and is directly related to the 
benefit-cost ratio.  To obtain more credible rate of return estimates, Chapter 4 then 
develops a novel method for recalibrating previously reported IRR estimates using the 
MIRR when there is limited information on an investment’s stream of benefits and costs.  
The recalibrated estimates of the rate of return are more modest (median of 9.8 versus 39 
percent per year) but are still substantial enough to question the current scaling back of 
public agricultural R&D spending in many countries. 
Chapter 5 applies a carefully-designed meta-analysis to explain the wide dispersion in 
the reported rates of return. It identifies factors, both those associated with R&D 
investment portfolio and those associated with evaluation methodologies, that help 
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account for the variation in IRR estimates while controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity and potential correlations between individual rate of return estimates. 
Findings in this chapter will not only help researchers to detect critical methodological 
issues in the evaluation literature but also provide clues to policymakers regarding future 
public agricultural R&D policy. 
In conclusion, this dissertation makes substantial contributions to the understanding of 
agricultural production efficiency and productivity from a few aspects. Firstly, it 
provides an explanation for the prevalence and persistence of land fragmentation by 
pointing out its role in risk management. By evaluating its efficiency effects along with 
the risk effects, this dissertation further suggests improvements on current methodology 
of efficiency analysis. The empirical findings of this dissertation will help inform future 
land policies that have development goals, while the mathematical model developed in 
this dissertation will be instrumental for future efforts to better measure production 
efficiency in the context of risk. Secondly, this dissertation contributes to the 
methodologies underlying the agricultural R&D evaluation literature by proposing the 
more accurate rate of return measure MIRR as opposed to the prevalent IRR measure. It 
also identifies factors that account for the variation in the reported rate of return 
estimates using a rigorous meta-regression model. This dissertation not only pinpoints 
critical methodological issues in evaluating agricultural R&D investments but also 
informs future public policies on agricultural R&D and productivity. 
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